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ABSTRACT
CONTROLLED GROWTH STRATEGIES
AND THE POOR
by
CHARLES MILLER COLLINS
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies
and Planning on May ll, 1973 in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Master of City Planning
This thesis is the result of an interest in how
controlled growth policies will affect the mobility of
the poor. Various levels of government are taking steps to
limit their growth by putting fixed levels on the number of
residents allowed in the community as defined by housing
construction, or by specifying the rate of growth allowed
in various sectors of the economy.
Controlled growth policies will have definite and
ultimately, measureable impacts on the poor. By limiting
the number of houses to be built, and prohibiting industrial
growth or expansion, the traditional symbols of economic
mobility for the poor will be changed in those contexts.
If opportunities are based upon housing and jobs, then
governmental actions st'opping growth must be measured to
determine if those controls adversely affect the poor.
Our legal system is evolving the concept that
cities must be sensitive to the regional housing demands
for low and moderate income housing. Increasingly, de
exclusionary cities are being required to assume theiF
"fair-share" of the low income housing responsibility. Thus,
when cities decide to limit their growth, they typically
specify a certain amount of low income housing to be built
to avoid allegations of exclusionary controlled growth
ordinances. But housing is not enough to complete the
opportunity structure of the poor. If jobs which fit the
skill levels of the low income residents, future and present,
are not a part of those controlled growth strategies, there
is an illusion of mobility as represented by housing.
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The illusion of low income opportunity in suburban
contexts has great potential for interfering with other
processes which will ultimately be instrumental in minorities
achieving political parity in the United States. Power
bases for minorities and low income people in the cities and
in rural areas is a crucial phenonemon in recent political
developments. Providing access to state houses and the
nation's Capitol is a critical function of that power. To
trade-off that political power for the illusion of opportunity
in the suburbs, however it may be defined, requires that
those suburban opportunities be long-term. If political
power is not traded for economic stability, there can be
little justification for advocating the suburbanization
of racial and economic minorities.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Assistant Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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PREFACE
The rapid post World War II suburban expansion in the
United States has not produced an equitable opportunity struc-
ture for all income and racial groups. Though the process of
land development has generated new housing and employment,
leap frog and undirected sprawl has created growth patterns
which are often ecologically disastrous and fiscally waste-
ful. Without countervailing public policies, the private
market does not tend to increase the mobility of minority
groups and the poor in the suburbs. The government has not
implemented affirmative guidelines for a better distribution
of opportunity resulting from the growth. Existing trends of
uncontrolled growth mean further racial and income segregation
as well as unequal access to environmental and economic ameni-
ties.
The marked absence of long range public policies in the
field of land use planning has been responded to on national,
state, and local levels. Implicit is the assumption that if
current trends of land consumption are not challenged and met
with goals for growth, those environmental amenities and bene-
fits which can be attributed to suburbanization will be negat-
ed. Most of the impetus for land use control grows out of
on either fiscal or environmental concerns. National Land
ix
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Use Policy Bills, the National Environmental Policy Act,
State land use policies, a tremendous dialogue on general wel-
fare zoning and planning requirements in the common law, and
local attempts to control growth are all aimed at altering
the pattern and quality of land conversion and development.
There are, however, profound social dimensions of land
use policy that have long been ignored. Increasing affluence
in the suburbs is paralleled by increasing relative poverty
in cities. It is important to recognize how recent efforts
to control or to slow down growth will affect various income
and minority groups. Without specific criteria and incentives
to provide opportunities for low income groups, no-growth
planning strategies will impede the mobility of the poor; the
results of which will be an extension of the status quo pro-
vided with new ecological and financial arguments. No-growth
policies must be reconciled with concerns for the overriding
general welfare. Regions must not be created and countenanced
by governments which disproportionately distribute access to
select groups.
Most efforts to control growth have been initiated at
the local level. Though many advantages have -been derived
from the current patterns of development, localities perceive
a conflict between future growth and the quality of life.
Local actions tend to be parochial in scope. However,
regional demands from both developers and citizens for in-
creased housing, the need for industrial expansion as seen
by the private market, and the need for increased public
x
services and facilities exert pressures for modifications
of the concept of local no-growth.
Many minority sub-groups within the population see
their needs for shelter and employment in diametric opposi-
tion to no-growth. The elderly need housing, the unemployed
need jobs, the low income need housing which they can afford,
the handicapped and unemployable require housing and many
public welfare facilities.
Those who have already received the benefits of sub-
urbanization must not close opportunities to those who now
require new facilities in which to relocate. When localities
seek to change their growth patterns and rates, they must look
not only inward to define the scope and solution of the pro-
blems; they must look outward to understand their responsibi-
lity to the region in which they exist. Only in such a way
are the possible regressive effects of no-growth to be avoid-
ed. It is only through such a balancing process that more
enlightened goals and directions for future urban growth be-
come explicit.
xi
INTRODUCTION
Greater understanding of the complexities of ecology
and the fragility of the natural environment requires that
advocates of growth specify under what assumptions continued
continued development should occur. Natural resources are
scarce, eminent shortages of fuel and developable land,
global competition for capital assets and the raw materials
from which goods are produced, combine to make uncontrolled
growth infeasible.
Between 10 and 20 per cent of the population of the
United States is malnourished or hungry. Families which
have incomes under poverty levels represent approximately
20 per cent of the population. Between 15 and 20 per cent
of the population is ill-housed.
Therefore, the articulation of more equitable ways of
redistributing the economic resources and environmental
amenities which result from urban development should be
among the highest priorities of future urban growth policies.
Growth in economic sectors which address the mobility of the
poor is a legitimate basis for growth.
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A recently compiled list of cities, regions and states
which are instituting controlled growth policies, indicated
that the scope of concern for development controls is great.*
During the next decades, it can be expected that.this phenome-
non will increase in scope. How to deal with the effects of
governmentally imposed non-growth policies in light of the
needs of the poor is a major question.
In the legal literature, land use law addresses the role
of public intervention in the process of land conversion.
While there is no explicit national urban growth policy, there
are policies implicit in the legal structure which regulates
legislative actions. Constitutional provisions require public
actions to be made with respect to the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Developments in the common
law have clarified the various due process and general welfare
requirements of the police power. However, to depend upon con-
stitutional or common law alone to define urban growth policy
would be limiting. The courts cannot initiate legislative
acts, they can only regulate and clarify legislative policies
and actions.
Furthermore, it is not clear that laws are implemented
in such a way as to accomplish the purposes or goals under which
they are legislated. Therefore, other methods must intervene
to establish and direct urban growth policies.
* Conference at the National Association of Home Builders,
Washington, D.C., March 1973. It was estimated that 34 cities
15 regions, 5-7 states .are instituting measures to control
or specify urban growth.
An equitable distribution- of housing and income is not
a natural result of urban growth. Assuming that better sys-
tems to allocate income and housing are necessary and desire-
able goals of urban growth, there are relatively few policies
which directly address that position. Equity is often inter-
preted as fairness. "Our concept of what is fair is an evol-
ving one, as we slowly forge an economic bill of rights con-
sisting of guaranteed income, access to education, compen-
sation to victims of discrimination, crime, sickness, etc."1
However, there are few measures of economic equity. Defining
parameters by which the fairness of controlled growth policies
can be judged is the purpose of this study.
John Stuart Mill presented a theory of utility which is
easily adopted as a goal. Yet, Mill's theory offers little
in the way of practical ways of implementing that goal.
Lester Thurow suggests that there are several directions from
which one can attempt to specify economic equity:2
1 William Alonso, Equity and its Relation to Efficiency
in Urbanization, Institute of Urban and Regional Development,
University of California, Berkeley, California, July, 1968.
2
Lester Thurow, "Towards a Definition of Economic Justice,"
The Public Interest, Number 31, Spring 1973, New York, Page 58.
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1) Reliance can be placed on process and procedures.
An economic game is fair or equitable when indivi-
duals agree on the rules of the game, and any out-
come of that game is thus considered just.
2) Individual preferences can be the key criterion.
Equity is achieved when society reaches the distri-
bution of economic resources that generates the most
agreement. This is basically an anarchistic approach.
3) Merit, however defined, can be used to specify equity.
Equity occurs when resources are distributed in the
same manner as merit. Based essentially upon a
free market concept of distribution, he who contri-
butes the most, gets the most.
4) Equity can be related to the common good, however
defined. Equity is that distribution of economic
resources that maximizes the common good.
Each of these definitions of equity devolves into the
problem of what the individual or society decides to be a
value system. Thurow responds to this problem suggesting
that economists have abandoned their quest for a definition
of economic equity, and that there are other ways of ration-
alizing the distribution of economic rewards. He suggests
that economic resource redistribution should be done according
to specified goals.3 Moreover, he states that one particular
system of distributing economic resources is more equitable
than another at some moment in time. His whole assumption con-
cern.ing the most useful system of economic resource distri-
bution is that it should follow specified goals and priorities
determined in the political arena. Economic equity should pro-
3 Ibid at 75.
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ceed as an extension of other political and social goals.
Therefore, the economic resources which are results of urban
growth should be redistributed according to specified policies.
If job and housing resource distribution to the poor, job
training, educational or health facilities are stated public
policies which must accompany growth, the market must be dealt
with in such a way as to produce those results. Since the
capitalist ethic will never fully allow a completely average
level of income for all people, this will perpetuate an accept-
able degree of inequality.
There is a big jump from formulating policy stating that
low income opportunity enhancement is a goal of urban growth,
to a strategy for implementing that goal. Jay Forrester has
stated that to separate housing from income or employment as
a goal is ultimately detrimental to the opportunity structure
and mobility of the poor. Forrester's urban dynamics model is
extremely important because it presents a wholistic approach
to specifying and analyzing goals for urban growth. It has
been criticized, however, for not relating to regional questions.
Growth policies often advocate housing construction for
the poor in order to create a context of mobility. Forrester
demonstrates through his urban dynamics simulations that low-
cost housing programs are much more detrimental to the long-
run conditions of the urban area than other strategies with
redistributive or income generating motivations, such as employ-
. 406"Wor
-6-
ment programs, job-training programs or tax subsidies.4
Forrester's research has been the subject of great criticism,
but it highlights the fact that solutions often based upon an
intuitive approach to problem solving can adversely affect
5the very problems they are designed to alleviate.
The existence of opportunities in the suburbs for low
income, low skills level people may be an illusion. This
myth is reinforced when energies are focused on building
low cost housing instead of. generating jobs. Housing may
present the illusion of opportunity for low income people.
Commonly, in complex systems a vicious
cycle develops in which the action
erroneously assumed to be corrective
makes the problem worse and the worsening
calls forth still more of the presumed
remedial action, which only further aggre-
vates the situation. 6
What is referred to as increased remedial action is increased
public assistance and welfare payments.
Framed in this context, controlled growth policies must
specify those aspects of low income opportunity they will en-
hance. One-dimensional "fair-share" or equitable housing allo-
4 Jay Forrester, Urban Dynamics, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1969, Page 65.
Ibid, at Page 70.
6 Ibid.
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cations for low and moderate income may become regressive if
other aspects of mobility are not included in the policy de-
sign. If nothing else, the examination of income and housing
and the law provide a matrix in which to analyze and assess
urban growth policies. The free market has little stake in
the future of the poor insofar as creating housing and jobs.
Therefore, governments must assure that goals for economic
resource redistribution are explicit urban growth policies.
Our goals for continued growth must be made more ex-
plicit beyond priorities expressed in budgetary allocations,
military spending, transportation and highway construction.
Recent debate in Congress and other levels of government
has produced a series of reports and legislative proposals to
create goals for urban growth. Though there exists nothing
which can be labeled national urban growth policy, Congress
is on the verge of passing what, will become a National Land
Use Policy.
Bills introduced into the 92nd Congress by Senator
Jackson and Representative Aspinall, under the Senate and House
Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs as well as a com-
promise bill submitted by the Administration have called for
a National Land Use Policy. Existing legislation under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 details what role
the federal government will have on assessing the impact on
the environment of its expenditures. Along with the Housing
-8 -
and Urban Development Acts, these bodies of legislation will
form what can be called the beginnings of more formal goals for
urban growth.
The illusion of low income opportunity in suburban con-
texts has great potential for interfering with other processes
which will ultimately be instrumental in minorities achieving
political parity in this country. Power bases for minorities
and low income people in the cities is a crucial phenompnon
in recent political developments. providing access to state
houses and the nation's Capitol is a critical function of that
power. To trade-off that political power for the economic
opportunities in the suburbs, however they may be defined,
requires that those opportunities be long-term. If political
power is not traded for economic stability, there can be little
justification for advocating the suburbanization of racial
and economic minorities.
CHAPTER I
THE LAW AND URBAN GROWTH CONTROLS
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LEGAL ASPECTS OF CONTROLLED GROWTH
This chapter uses case law to illustrate the use and
misuse of the zoning power in controlling growth. The exam-
ples presented are by no means exhaustive. They do, however,
demonstrate the dilemmas of land use planning and limiting
urban growth. Cities must control certain aspects of urban
growth. But in so doing, the opportunity structure of the
poor and racial minority groups demanding employment mobility
and requiring access to housing must not be pre-empted.
The genesis of controlled growth policies
may be found in the adverse reaction in
many communities to rapid residential
growth. This growth has produced three
sources of concern: (1) housing has been
developed that is not supported by ade-
quate community facilities, suCh as roads
and schools, which have become overcrowded
as a result; (2) the attempted provision
of these facilities has occasioned a rapid
increase in real property taxation, parti-
cularly' for earlier arrivals to the commu-
nity; and (3) the failure to provide some
facilities such as sewers and waste treat-
ment plants, has contributed to deterioration
of the quality of ground water or nearby
streams, lakes, or other bodies of water. 1
1 The Potomac Institute, Inc., Controlling Urban Growth --
But for Whom? Unpublished manuscript, January 12, 1973,
Page 2-3.
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Many cities and states are changing their perception of
the benefits of unlimited urban growth. There are many reasons
for this modification. There is a greater understanding of
the tremendous expense caused by the need to finance public
infrastructure and services, an understanding that the current
patterns of growth produce many unnecessary adverse effects on
the physical environment, inherent or overt residues of racial,
class and economic discrimination, finally, a need to con-
trol population growth.
Zoning is the basis for most locally controlled urban
growth. As an extension of the power to promote the health,
safety, morals and general welfare, and granted by state
enabling legislation to municipalities, zoning allows cities
to exercise control over the patterns of urban development.
Under the aegis of a comprehensive plan, a city may segregate
various uses of the land.2 Industrial, commercial and resi-
dential uses may be separated in space and intensity through
zoning ordinances. Residential densities can be categorized
and separated. Multi-family housing may be separated from
very low density single family housing.
2 Ambler Realty Co., v. Village of Euclid, 297 Fed. 307, 313,
316, (N.D. Ohio 1924); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,
272, U.S. 365, (1926) -
a
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However, the zoning power is granted to localities by
the state, and the exercise of those powers must, in an affir-
mative way, further the "general welfare." Zoning ordinances
which are shown not to encourage the general welfare are com-
monly invalidated by the courts. This discussion looks at
the common law surrounding the use of zoning to control resi-
dential and industrial land use at the municipal level.
Zoning must be implemented within a comprehensive plan
established by a governmental body responsible for the affect-
ed area, which demonstrates that the categorization of various
uses is neither unreasonable, nor arbitrary. Among the more
important purposes under which zoning can be used are the
lessening of congestion in the streets, the prevention of
overcrowding of land or buildings, and the determination and
encouragement of the highest and best use of land.*
Historically, most cities were relatively discrete en-
tities with little regional interaction or responsibility.
But with the post World War II suburbanization, "urban sprawl"
has characterized growth. Cities and regions are becoming co-
terminous; the effects of one municipality's actions are quick-
ly felt in adjacent jurisdictions. Because of -this, the con-
cept of "general welfare" is no longer strictly a local phe-
nomonon. As the regional aspects of urban growth have become
* See discussion of the zoning power on page 49 footnote 2
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better understood, the regional responsibilities of local
actions have become more important. Local zoning is increas-
ingly required to take into consideration these regional im-
pacts.
To prevent uncontrolled and unwanted aspects of growth,
localities have traditionally employed a variety of planning
mechanisms -- large lot zoning; minimum lot floor space, and
bedroom specifications; fiscal zoning, and the segregation of
uses. The legitimacy of these controls rests primarily on
financial and environmental arguments. A locality may de-
clare that-it cannot finance further capital improvements un-
less they are programmed and phased overtime. In addition,
because certain types of uses are potentially harmful to the
drainage, sewerage, or water quality systems they cannot be
allowed -- ecological and physical features of the area (flood-
plains, faults, severe inclines, wetlands, etc.) may pre-
clude certain types of uses.
"Controlled-growth," "phased-growth" or "no-growth"
policies are therefore increasingly being adopted or con-
sidered by localities to reduce their rate and volume of urban
growth. Some municipalities have imposed restrictions only
on housing and related development. Others place restrictions
on all types of growth.
Implementation of these policies takes many forms.
"Moratoria" on the issuance of building and subdivision per-
mits, or on the issuance of new sewer and water permits are
-14-
common tactics. These are usually interim measures to halt
growth while more elaborate and comprehensive growth guide-
lines are developed.
Effects of these controls are obvious. More conventional
policies, such as the underzoning of land for residential uses
generally or for apartments in particular, or limiting the
number of bedroomsin an apartment -- so-called fiscal zoning --
preclude certain family sizes and potentially restrict cer-
tain racial, economic and age groups. "In addition, the trans-
fer of costs for sewage, drainage, roads or recreation from
municipalities to residential developers can provide a means
to assure that more expensive housing, or less altogether,
will result."3 Large scale open space acquisitions by munci-
palities remove tremendous amounts of potentially developable
land from the market.
While there are usually valid reasons for the zoning
or acquisition of these lands -- creation of recreational
facilities and parks, preservation or enhancement of water
quality -- the increasing use of environmental arguments as
a basis of local controls makes one question- whether these
are contemporary surrogates for fiscal, snob, or exclusionary
zoning.
3 Potomac, op. cit., page 3.
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However, municipalities have many legitimate arguments
for slowing growth. Without stronger regional and state finan-
cing of the improvements which accompany urban expansion, muni-
cipalities continue to bear the brunt of such facilities.
The existing method of financing is both inefficient and re-
gressive. Either the municipality pays directly for infra-
structure improvements and in turn discourages further resi-
dential development because of the monetary constraints, or
the municipality passes the costs on to the developer. As a
consequence, the developer must pass them to the consumer.
Absent of strong public policy and subsidy incentives, the
developer rarely is able to provide the housing necessary for
people with low incomes. The increasing segregation of people
by income is perpetuated. Access to employment in suburban
areas is diminished because of limited housing opportunities.
The common law is an extremely important way of inter-
vening in the process of land conversion and the possible re-
gressive effects. When evidence proves that zoning and plan-
ning do not advance the general welfare, the powers have
been misused. If zoning has been instituted without due pro-
cess of the law in a factual or procedural sense, there is a
misuse of those powers. If overt, or de jure racial dis-
crimination results, or if one particular income group.has
been excluded from a municipality because of the zoning
ordinance, there are possible grounds for a denial of the
ordinance on grounds of equal protection before the law.
0
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If the general welfare of the region or state has been un-
reasonably diminished because of municipal actions, the police
powers have been violated.
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HOUSING: Large Lot Zoning to Restrict Municipal Growth
Large lot zoning is a tool used by many municipalities
to control the type of residential development permitted in
their boundaries. Such zoning has been upheld as a valid
exercise of the zoning power when it does not unreasonably
interfere with the general welfare. Where a municipality does
not take into account the impact of its restrictions on the
housing needs of the region, such regulations may constitute
an unreasonable exercise of the police power. Most lawsuits
that raise the question are brought by land owners or develop-
ers who assert that the regulation deprives them of reasonable
use of their property without "due process of law." The
developer will presumably represent the public interest in
that his development will provide housing opportunities for
citizens needing shelter. Such violations represent arroga-
tions of powers delegated to municipalities in the zoning
enabling acts.
This statutory interpretation by a court,
however, could merely invite the redrafting
of state legislation. Some observers fear
that if this happened, anti-central city
state legislatures would take the opportunity
to make more explicit the delegated power of
suburban localities to exclude 'unwanted'
people. Consequently, a more basic objection
regards unilateral exclusion as inherently
-18-
unreasonable and therefore an unconsti-
tutional exercise of power even were it
more consistent with state law ... Regional
housing needs are relevant to both the
statutory and constitutional approaches
to the question. 4
The evolution of regional responsibilities with respect
to residential opportunities for all income groups is evi-
denced by several cases in state courts which discuss region-
al housing/general welfare demands.
A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is
to prevent the entrance of newcomers, in order
to avoid the future burdens, economic or other-
wise, upon the administration of public services
and facilities cannot be held valid, of course,
we do not mean to imply that a governmental body
may not utilize its zoning power in order to
insure that the municipal services which the
community requires are provided in an orderly
and rational manner.. 5
Arguments advanced in many localities to legitimate controlled
growth are that the environmental amenities desired by the
residents are in conflict with high development rates.
Large lot zoning is a technique to pre-empt high density
development. The by-product just happens to be a pre-emp-
tion of the types of housing most often available to low
and moderate income families.
Potomac, op. cit., page 29
5 National Land and Investment Co., v. Easttown Township
Boardof Adjustment, 419 Pa., 504, 215 A. 2d 597 at 612.
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There is no doubt that many of the residents
of this area are highly desirous of keeping
it the way it is, prefering quite naturally,
to look out upon the land in its natural
state, rather than on to other homes.
These desires, however, do not rise to the
level of public welfare. This is purely a
matter of private desire which zoning regu-
lations may not be employed to effectuate. 6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further clarified and expanded
on National Land in a decision concerning large lot zoning,
-The Appeal .of Kit-Mar Builders, inc., 268 A. 2d 612. Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc., entered into an agreement to purchase a 140-
acre tract of land in Concord Township, Pennsylvania. The
agreement was contingent on the tract's being rezoned to per-
mit single-family homes to be developed on one-acre lots.
At the time the tract was zoned to require lot of no less than
two-acres along existing roads and no less than three acres
in the interior. The zoning board upheld the minimum lot
requirements.
The court held that the zoning ordinance under the cir-
cumstances of this case was completely unreasonable. Basing
the ordinance on a contention that smaller lots will create
a sewerage problem, the court rejected the argument that
sewerage problems could not excuse exclusionary zoning in
National Land. This case was, however, litigated before
NEPA 102 environmental impact statements became a tool for
controlling growth. Yet the court held in National Land
that because there were alternative methods for dealing with
6
a
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nearly all the problems that attend growth, including sewer-
age problems, zoning which had an exclusive purpose or effect
could not be allowed. The Court has frequently adverted to
the effects of overly restrictive zoning on population
growth, housing supply, and social mobility, with the result-
ing exclusionary zoning. Planning considerations and other
interests can justify varied lot sizes in given areas of a
community which are reasonable. "At some point along the
spectrum, however, the size of lots ceases to be a concern
requiring public regulation and becomes a matter of private
I'7
preference."
The implication of our decision in National
Land is that communities must deal with the
problem of population growth. They may not
refuse to confront the future by adopting
zoning regulations that effectively restrict
population to near present levels. It is not
for any given township to say who may or may not
live within its confines, while disregarding the
interests of the entire area. 8
These cases concern instances where localities have passed
simplistic zoning ordinances based upon a basic economic
distinction between citizens. These people who can afford
expensive housing are in, those who cannot are out. However,
the courts have interpreted the zoning powers in more com-
7 419 Pa. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608
8 439 Pa. 466, 469, 469 A. 2d 765, 768 (1970)
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pelling terms. Controlled growth planning strategies must
base their schemes on more firm grounds. The consequence of
these two cases is that municipalities must plan for some
increment of growth in all reasonable housing categories.
Without clear ecological evidence that development is con-
trary to the general welfare, some growth and adjustment of
lot requirements is necessary.
-22-
LOCAL ZONING AS IT RELATES TO REGIONAL HOUSING NEEDS:
A Discussion of General Welfare as a Zoning Purpose
Reducing and restricting housing construction is a
method of controlling municipal growth. The effects of
this reduced housing supply may be felt in the region. The
common law has developed the concept of regional housing con-
siderations when shortages effect the general.welfare. Muni-
cipalities may not flout their regional responsibilities under
the zoning power. Oakwood at Madison, Inc., v. Township of
Madison,9 argues two concepts which are applicable to the legal
questions surrouding housing and controlling growth. First,
whether the court will use the zoning purpose of the general
welfare to require municipalities to provide additional hous-
ing for all people whom they encourage to work within their
10boundaries. Second, whether a municipality's zoning ordi-
nance which seriously inhibits the development of new housing
9 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A. 2d 353 (Law Div. 1971) N.J.
Sup. Ct. No. 8972 (cert. granted July 21, 1972)
10 283 A. 2d 353 at 356
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particularly multi-family dwellings is invalid for failing
to further the general welfare of the population in a geo-
graphical region where there is a critical housing shortage.
Madison Township clearly illustrates the "due process" require-
ments of the police power.
The case is a prerogative writ action challenging the
constitutionality of the state zoning enabling act and the
validity of the township ordinance. The Superior Court held
that the zoning ordinance of the township, which had approxi-
mately 30% of its land area vacant and developable, which
because of restricted land, limited multi-family buildings
to about 500 to 700 additional, none of which could be three
bedrooms or larger, and which divided most of the remaining
land to zones requiring one and two-acre lot minimums with
minimum floor space of 1,500 square feet and 1,600 square
feet respectively, was invalid for failure to promote a
reasonably balanced community in accordance with the general
welfare. There was an absence of a record to substantiate
a claim that safeguarding against flood and surface drainage
problems could be reasonably advanced by zoning revisions to
the town ordinance into low population density districts.
The action challenged the constitutionality of the
12
Zoning Act on the basis that it does not further the
general welfare as defined by regional needs. The plaintiffs
11 Id. at 355, .356
12 N.J.S.A. 40:55-30 et. seq.
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are two developers who own vacant and developable land in
Madison Township, and six individuals, all with low income,
representing a class of citizens who reside outside the town-
ship and have sought housing there unsuccessfully because of
the newly adopted zoning restrictions, including one and two-
acre minimum lot sizes. 13
Madison Township is 42 square miles in the southeast
corner of Middlesex County, New Jersey. In two decades of
explosive growth from 1950 to 1970, paralleling the trend in
the county and the region, its population mounted from 7,366
to 48,715. Most of the new housing was single-family in
developments on 15,000 square foot or smaller lots, and since
1965, multi-family in garden apartments. Reflecting school
construction and other expanded costs of government, the real
property tax rate increased from one of the lowest in 1950 to
the highest in 1970 in the county. Despite this growth, 30
per cent of the land is vacant and developable and it has been
estimated by a planning consultant in 1970 that the township
could hold a population of 200,000 without overcrowding.*
In 1970 the administration of the Township decided to
curb the population growth significantly and thus to stabilize
13 083 A. 2d 353 at 354
14 Id. at 355
Testimony before the planning board of Madison Township
at the presentation of the master plan in May 1970, by planning
consultant to the municipality.
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the tax rate. It sought to shift the character of develop-
ment from explosive growth on a patchwork basis to orderly
growth in densely developed areas and the preservation of
open space.
The attack on the constitutionality of the Zoning Act was
aimed at expanding the definition of general welfare in
regional terms. The plaintiffs contended that the declared
zoning purposes of the New Jersey Zoning Act are fatally de-
fective, thwarting the general welfare because they fail to
encompass housing needs. The plaintiffs contend that the
enabling legislation reflects a basically static population
and is not commensurate to the general welfare today in a
time of rapid population expansion.15
The provision for housing needs, local and regional is
not a specified purpose of zoning under N.J.S.A. 40:55-32,
however, the general welfare is. Although the general wel-
15 N.J.S.A. 40:55-32 Such regulations shall be in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan and designed for one or more
of the following purposes: to lessen congestion in the streets;
secure safely.from fire, flood, panic and other dangers; pro-
mote health, morals, or the general welfare; provide adequate
lighting and.air; prevent the overcrowding of land or build-
ings; avoid undue concentrations of population. Such regula-
tions shall be made with reasonable consideration among other
things, to the character of the district and its particular
suitability for particular uses, and with a view of con-
serving the value of property and encouraging the most appro-
priate use of land throughout such municipality.
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f are is stated as a disjunctive zoning purpose, it cannot be
circumvented or flouted in municipal zoning.16 This line of
argument led the court to state:
it cannot be maintained that the Legis-
lature in the Zoning Act has empowered
municipalities to defy the general welfare
or to ignore housing needs insofar as such
needs are embraced within the general wel-
fare. 17
The constitutionality of the State Zoning Act was upheld.
Madison Township has attempted to balance the munici-
pality by restricting various types of housing construction.
It has limited the amount of multi-family units per year to
200. Its contentions were that it was seeking a balanced
community, encouraging high income and moderate income hous-
ing to balance the predominant low income housing, and pro-
tecting drainage systems where high density residential de-
velopment might result in floods and surface drainage problems
and interfere with and imperil underground water resources.
To enforce the construction of single family, middle and upper
income housing, minimum lot requirements were built into the
local zoning ordinance. In testimony, it could not be sub-
16 Harrington Glen, Inc., v.. Mun. Bd. Adj., Leonia, 52
N.J. 22, 32, 243 A. 2d 233 (1968); Roselle v. Wright, 21.
N.J. 400, 410, 122 A. 2d 506 (1956); Katobimar Realty Co. v.
Webster 20 N.J. 114, 122, 123, 118 A. 2d 824 (1955); Schmidt
v. Board of Adjustment, Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 416, 88 A. 2d 607
(1952); Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. Marcate City, 112 N.J.
Super, 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970).
17 283 A. 2d 353 at 356
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stantiated that such large lot zoning would safeguard against
flood and drainage problems.
In Madison Township's approach to the objective of
balance, its attempted cure is a worse malady than whatever
imbalance existed. About 8000 acres of land, apparently
prime for low or moderate income housing development, have
been taken out of the reach of 90% of the population, and are
prohibitive in land and construction costs. The acreage
available for multi-family apartment units is' miniscule.'
Families with more than one child are barred from multi-
family apartments because of one and two bedroom restrictions
in the zoning ordinance, without any guise of a health or
safety purpose.18
The court maintained that the exclusionary approach
in the ordinance coincided in time with a desperate housing
shortage in the county and region and expanded programs, fede-
ral and state, for subsidized housing for low and moderate
income families. The judgment rules that regional needs
19
are a proper consideration in local zoning.
18 283 A. 2d 353 at 358
19 DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No. 1, 56
N.J. 428, 267 A. 2d 31 (1970); Duffcon Concrete Products v.
Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 513, 64 A. 2d 347 (1949); Garland v.
Maywood, 45 N.J. Super. 1, 6, 131 A. 2d 529 (App. Div. 1957);
Molino v. Mayor, etc., Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 204,
281 A. 2d 401 (Law Div. 1971).
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In pursuing the valid zoning purpose of
a balanced community, a municipality must
not ignore housing needs, that is, its
fair proportion of the obligation to meet
the housing needs of its own population
and of the region. Housing needs are en-
compassed within the general welfare. The
general welfare does not stop at each muni-
cipal boundary. 20
The court held that the ordinance was invalid because
it failed to promote reasonably a balanced community in
accordance with the general welfare. The decision leaves
open the possibility that a municipality which does not attract
business or offer employment to a large number of people may
retain a more restricted residential pattern. The Madison
court's emphasis on consideration of factors transcending
municipal jurisdictional boundaries suggests that if a muni-
cipality lies in a natural conduct of regional growth, it
cannot avoid providing a share of the housing for the region-
al population.21 The court offered little in the way of cri-
teria for the decision up to a compromise of the municipal
planning board and the private market.
20 283 A. 2d 353 at 357
21 26: Rutgers Law Review, 2 Winter 1973, 401
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Comments
The importance of the Madison Township case is that
it clarifies the general welfare as a regional concern. The
ordinance in question so restricted the total area available
for multi-family housing so that no more than 500 to 700
additional units could be built at all within the city, and
none of the units could exceed two bedrooms. Furthermore,
land and construction costs were such that minimum purchase
prices for most of the housing would be between $45,000 and
$50,000. Only those with incomes in the top 10% of the
nation and county could finance new housing in these areas.
Clearly, there is a conflict between the demands of
the region and the municipal zoning ordinance. The case
argues that if a locality so limits its available developable
land as to create a regional inequity without legitimate fis-
cal or environmental constraints, the ordinance is in viola-
tion of the police power under which zoning is granted.
The case does not speak to the problem of financing
growth. When a municipality is unable to shoulder the mone-
About 55% of the land area of the township is zoned R40 or
R80. Minimum lot size is one acre in R40 and two acres in
R80. Minimum floor space is 1500 square feet and 1600 square
feet respectively. Since 1930 there has not been a develop-
ment on a two-acre lot. Since 1964 only one subdivis'ion
plan for one-acre lots has been proposed.
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tary burden of providing public services and facilities to
accommodate regional housing demands who should pay? In
planning and budgetary terms, the intervention of a regional
authority which would help to finance infrastructure improve-
ments appears to be necessary. More sophisticated municipal
controlled growth schemes base their zoning on the develop-
ment of programs for capital improvements which will phase
growth. These strategies have been generally upheld as valid
exercises of the zoning power.
-31-
RESIDENTIAL GROWTH CONTROL: Municipal Phased-Growth Zoning
Ordinances
Municipal controlled growth plans have become sophisti-
cated well beyond National Land, the Appeal of Kit-Mar, and
Madison Township. Recently, arguing that the limits of muni-
cipal finance constrain the amount of housing development
which the city can absorb at any given time, in 1971 the Town
of Ramapo, New York instituted a phased-growth plan of urban
growth.
The town amended its zoning ordinance to prevent housing
development or subdivision of land unless the developer of
such housing receives a "special permit." A permit is granted
if the land to be developed is adequately serviced by certain
public facilities. Construction of these facilities is sche-
duled in accordance with the town capital improvement plan
(CIP). Land not near enough to municipal facilities may not
be developed until such service criteria is met or for as long
as eighteen years, after which all pre-existing city growth
constraints are lifted. To prevent a taking of property with-
out just compensation, and because development potential has
been deferred, the tax on such land is reduced according to a
scale of diminished value.
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The ordinance places an additional layer
onto the residential plat-approval process
be requiring persons who directly or in-
directly cause land to be used for residen-
tial purposes, to secure a 'special permit'
before they can apply for site plan or sub-
division approval, or for a building permit.
An applicant, in order to receive a special
permit, must achieve a minimum of 15
development points out of a possible 23
points. Points are 'awarded' on a sliding
scale, based on the relative availability
of five municipal services to each proposed
house on the plat. These services include:
sewers or approved substitutes; drainage
facilities; roads; firehouses; and parks,
or recreation facilities including school
sites. 22
The basic plan for controlling growth is aimed at popu-
lation growth. Phasing residential development is at the
crux of the strategy. The ordinance is limited to the resi-
dential sector because it is felt that such uses contribute
less to the tax base than commercial and industrial uses,
which do not fall under the purview of the ordinance. The
stated goals of the Ramapo "phased-growth plan" are:
1. To economize on the costs of municipal facilities
and services to carefully phase residential develop-
ment with efficient provision of public improve-
ments;
22 The State and Urban Reporter, published by the National
Association of Homebuilders, Washington, D.C. 20036. Issue
of July-Aug. 1972.
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2. To establish and maintain municipal control over
the eventual character of development;
3. To establish and maintain a desireable degree of
balance among the various uses of the land;
4. To establish and maintain essential quality of
community services and facilities.23
In Madison Township, the court stated that a municipality
had the responsibility to allow housing opportunities for all
people employed within the locality. The Ramapo ordinance
clearly restricts housing development while establishing no
new growth constraints on commercial, business and industrial
uses. People are still encouraged to construct facilities
and to generate employment, yet, commensurate new housing
is highly limited. Because Ramapo has theoretically provided
margins in which all types of housing development must occur,
presumably, no particular income group will be unreasonably
discriminated against.
Phasing or staging growth over time received judicial
sanction in Golden v. The Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo,
Where it is clear that' the existing physical
and financial resources of the community are
inadequate to furnish the essential services
and facilities which a -substantial increase
23
"Ramapo" an editorial Planning, ASPO, July 1972 p. 108
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in population requires, there is a rational
basis for 'phased-growth' and hence, the
challenged ordinance is not in violate of.
the Federal and State Constitutions. 24
The Ramapo ordinance presents fiscal arguments for slow-
ing and phasing its growth over a certain period of time.
Yet, the purpose of the regulation is neither to prevent
development in an ultimate sense, nor to be unreasonable in
its regional responsibility. The majority opinion in Golden
v. Ramapo recognized the importance of a public interest in
the control of land that is larger than reflected in the muni-
cipality exercising the powers. Ostensibly, Ramapo comes into
conformity with other cases which extend general welfare re-
quirements. The opinion describes as "largely antiquated"
the notion that regulation of land use and development is
"uniquely a function of local government. "25 In qualifying
its endorsement of the Ramapo ordinance, the court adds that
growth may not be permanently restricted and must ultimately
be allowed because of the overriding pressures of population
growth, and the enhancement of the general welfare.
There is, then, something inherently suspect
in a scheme which, apart from its professed
purpose, effects a restriction upon the free
mobility of a people until sometime in the
future when projected facilities are avail-
able to meet increased demands. Although
24 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138 (1972)
25 Potomac, op.cit. page 26.
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zoning must include schemes designed
to allow municipalities to more effect-
ively contend with the increased demands
of evolving and growing communities,
under its guise, townships have been
wont to try their hand at an array of
exclusionary devices in the hopes of
avoiding the very burden which growth
must inevitably bring. 26
The court recognized the dilemma of balancing munici-
pal phased growth goals with the need to house people in ad-
jacent densely settled urban areas. The situation in Ramapo
is particularly critical because of its proximity to New York
City. Financing urban growth and providing the municipal
facilities and services which accompany development must be-
come regionally administered. "These problems cannot be
solved by Ramapo or any single municipality, but depend upon
the accommodation of widely disparate interests for their
ultimate resolution. To that end, statewide or regional con-
trol of planning would insure that interests broader than that
of the municipality underlie various land use policies."27
If the Ramapo ordinance were overtly aimed at the low
income sector, or at any particular racial minority in purpose
or effect, it would not have been upheld in court. The major-
26 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138 at 150; see National Land and Inv. Co.
v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d
597, supra; Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A. 2d 396; Concord
Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 266, 268, A. 2d 765
27 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138 at 150
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ity opinion made specific reference to the existence of pro-
visions for low and moderate income, and multi-family housing
in the town master plan emphasizing that it would not endorse
an exclusionary ordinance. Though~ the amount of such housing
was small, it apparently was sufficient to preclude denial of
the ordinance on equal protection grounds. It will take
several years to measure the results of the plan on the low
income opportunity structure.
If the CIP or the character of the facilities con-
structed under the plan prelude developments for the low
income, elderly, or other "aggreived" parties, these adverse
effects could be the basis for further litigation. Under
phased growth ordinances which time housing development in
accordance with the provisions of sewer and other capital
facilities, the plan for such facilities may determine the
character of private development, rather than private develop-
ment determine the nature of public facilities, which has
been the characteristic of urbanization in the United States.
It has been advanced that the Ramapo capital improvement
plan, in fact, is designed to support only low-density
housing as the town develops.
No effort is made in the capital plan to
promote "cluster" or multi-family housing
in areas that might be suitable for more
intensive uses. The capital improvement
plan thus contemplates a continuation of
a
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expensive and exclusionary "sprawl" which
in all probability would have occurred --
although somewhat faster -- without the
plan. 28
Therefore, if structural improvements cannot support higher
density developments, will the effects of the ordinance create
an exclusionary pattern denying due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the constitution?
Yet, there is a strong presumption of validity in favor
of town planning boards in cases such as Ramapo. The court
assumes that the city has reviewed all possible alternatives
to its ordinance and has chosen the one most acceptable to the
municipality's particular needs. The court cannot undertake
planning in and of itself, and the grounds underwhich it can
hold an ordinance unvalid are strongly limited. In the Ramapo
case, the court found neither a denial of due process nor of
equal protection. The fiscal arguments on which the plan was
based were found to be a valid and an accurate portrayal of
the financial conditions of the city. Since the ordinance
made provisions, albeit little, for low and moderate income
housing, it is not procedurally exclusionary. However, in
the long run, will private market pressures on land and con-
struction costs or a developer's internalized infrastructure
costs preclude construction of low cost housing? Will the
factual situation in Ramapo change as the plan evolves?
28 Potomac, op. cit., page 36
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What is lacking in the whole Ramapo case is an under-
standing of the regional growth phenomena and the effects
of local actions on those patterns. Municipal ordinances
such as Ramapo are chiefly concerned with local costs en-
tailed in financing urban growth and development. Thus,
decisions are made which attempt to minimize costs to the
local taxpayer with little regard for the transferral of
those costs to other taxpayers in other municipalities in the
region or the state. When one locality attempts to reduce
its costs, it may pose unreasonable costs on other areas.
"The costs which are sensitive to the patterns of land develop-
ment -- such as sewers, roads, fire protection -- cannot be
reduced in one locality without putting its neighbors under
greater stress to provide such services. Consequently, a
program of development timing dependent on the provision of
these public services may represent one locality's effort to
transfer such costs to another locality, more than an attempt
*
A developer may provide the necessary capital improvements
on his property to string his land up to development standards
instead of waiting for the improvements to be done under the
CIP in such cases. The costs are passed along to the consumer.
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to produce a more efficient use of land for residential
needs. ",29
What emerges is an interesting direction. The court
recognizes the need to control urban growth at the municipal
level through the institution of phased-growth zoning ordi-
nances. It also recognizes the possible exclusionary effects
of such an ordinance. Yet clearly, if localities throughout
the New York City metropolitan area adopted controlled growth
ordinances similar to Ramapo's the aggregate effect would
severely interfere with housing opportunities for nearly all
income sectors. It would withdraw a tremendous amount of
land from the market, and driving up the prices on the balance
so high that only the most wealthy could afford housing.
Though a no-growth region under Ramapo, Madison Township, or
National Land has not yet emerged, the possibility certainly
causes concern. Has the court countenanced such regions
through the Ramapo decision? Conversely, are localities forced
to exercise their zoning powers in such ways because of the
absence of re 'onal planning authorities which would help to
finance capital £. orovements according to regional needs?
29 Potomac, opScit. Page 38. The fact that Ramapo's not to
the commercial or industrial sectors suggests a strong simi-
larity to the fiscal zoning schemes commonly employed by local-
ities competing for the best tax base. If Ramapo is successful
in attracting commercial, light "clean" industry, office, re-
search, and softward developments while discouraging or "phas-
ing" residential development, it will be successful in pro-
viding its citizens with a higher level of public facilities
at a lower tax effort per household.
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MUNICIPAL CONTROLS ON INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND LOCATION:
How Cities Influence Low Income Employment Opportunity
Through Land Use Controls
Municipalities are able to influence low income oppor-
tunity by controlling various aspects of industrial and commer-
cial expansion. In turn, certain industrial resources affect
not only the supply of housing, but the employment opportunity
structure. Industrial growth can be limited by controlling
the use and development of land. The "nuisance doctrine"
and zoning by-laws are the primary mechanisms for such action.
The industrial growth which can be limited can be character-
ized as growth in the present location (intensive growth) and
the expansion of industries into new location (extensive
growth).
Nuisance, as one of the most direct extensions of the
police power, must be distinguished from the powers of emi-
nent domain; the former being a limitation or prohibition on
the operations of an enterprise without compensation, and
the latter being a taking of private property by a public
body with just compensation. Evident in both English and
American common law, nuisance is employed to prohibit or limit
the intensive and extensive growth or the existence of public-
ally obnoxious, offensive and detrimental uses. Because of
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its non-compensatory nature, the courts are very careful about
the application of nuisance as a legislative act, in order
to assure that the abatement is neither an arbitrary nor an
unreasonable abridgement of private property rights.
30In Lawton v. Steele, the court expanded on and clari-
fied the concept of the police power to limit industry through
nuisance. The concept is universally conceded to include
everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals,
and to justify the destruction or abatement of whatever may
be regarded as a public nuisance.
it must appear first, that the
interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particu-
lar class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 31
When a municipality chooses to impose the police power
in the abatement of a "nuisance" there are obvious trade-
offs. The employment and tax-generating capacities of the
enterprise are transferred elsewhere for the increased en-
vironmental amenity. In order to accomplish this limitation,
the application of nuisance must be directed at the causal
link between industrial activity and the degradation of the
general welfare through the loss of environmental quality.
30 152 U.S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385 (1894)
31 Ibid.
-42-
Extensive growth may adversely affect the human or physical
environment as may intensive growth through changes in the
size and dimensions of buildings. Added effluent and air pollu-
tion through internal capital growth, or added stress on exist-
ing traffic systems may constitute a basis for municipal action.
But again, the imposition of these municipal controls must
enhance the general welfare.
In addition to nuisance, which works on an ad hoc basis,
zoning and comprehensive planning further affect the distri-
bution and amount of industry. Through zoning, various uses,
densities, scales and classifications of industry can be se-
gregated and limited. Heavy industry can be segregated from
light "clean" industry. Zoning can define where a certain
type of industry can locate. Through the use of various in-
centives and disincentives, related to zoning, the attractive-
ness for growth, industrial mix and intensity within a muni-
cipality can be controlled.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., forwarded industrial zon-
ing as it did residential zoning. Municipalities have the
power to regulate land uses only in conjunction with a com-
32
prehensive plan. Therefore a town does have the right to
exercise control over the nature of its industrial base.
Of course there are many cases which modify the amount of
discretion a town may exert over industry, but the basic powers
of regulation remain.
32 Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 25, 75 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27
(1954)
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When a municipality decides that it is'in its best
interests to limit industrial growth, it may do so provided
it has weighed the impact on the community's future. But in
whose interests are certain types of industry discouraged?
Are all types of new industrial growth prohibited? Are capital
intensive, service and "clean" industries allowed, while labor
intensive facilities are discouraged? Has the municipality
created an overriding policy for the future industrial and
business growth of the community taking into consideration
the needs for development in certain employment sectors?
The above questions must be asked. Conclusions that can
be drawn from an analysis of the situation should determine
the properties of a controlled industrial growth policy.
In addition, the party that is responsible for such decisions
also makes a difference. Thus, a broad spectrum of interest
groups must be represented. The needs of minority groups,
the handicapped, the poor, and the industrial sector must be
balanced with the various interest groups concerned with
growth control.
The incidence of unemployment in an area mitigates
33
against absolute limitations over industrial growth. The
justification of industrial expansion and intensification by
its employment generating capacities have been seen as a
33 Oakwood at Madison, Inc., v. Township of Madison, Supra.
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legitimate general welfare basis for growth. Until either the
overall demand for employment is satisfied by the private
market, or a national income redistribution policy is implement-
ed, it can be argued that limited specified -- industrial
growth must continue. Since the federal government has been
reluctant to institute more extensive national income redistri-
bution, there are compelling reasons why the private sector
must continue to create certain types of employment. Alloca-
tions of industrial growth may be done as are. "fair share"
housing allocations; on a regional basis.
What are the overriding problems which limitations on
industrial growth solve? What are the relationships between
the perception of that problem and a municipality's abilities
to affect the problem. It was initially suggested that un-
limited industrial growth tends to cause environmental de-
terioration and rapid resource depletion. Natural resources
(mineral, water, and land) ard scarce, and proponents of "zero
economic growth" (ZEG) state that the consumption of such re-
sources should be curtailed land phased.
Many of the more sophisticated proponents of limited
economic growth at the municipal scale certainly understand
the necessity of changing existing national patterns of con-
sumption and waste. However, many of the problems of limiting
industrial growth require national intervention. Energy-related
policies, mineral resource allocation, patterns of military-
industrial spending, and other principal features of the eco-
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nomy are determined by the national government. Localities
may certainly wish to intervene in that process, yet, their
spheres of influence often are not extensive enough. Local
frustration at the lack of ability to affect national priori-
ties is a possible root of strong municipal actions to assure
more sensitive economic growth policies.
Does it necessarily follow, however, that increased
industrial development means decreased environmental quality?
In cases that it does (unavoidably high levels of effluent
or air pollution) there may be legitimate grounds for a muni-
cipality to prohibit such an industry. The decrease in en-
vironmental quality may outweigh the benefits of any employ-
ment and tax generating capabilities of the industry. The
use of an extended nuisance doctrine can be a more precise
balancing test for the utility of a certain industry and can
be another method of land use allocation. A blanket statement
that all industry is prohibited in a municipality may be too
extreme. Many facilities have little detrimental output and
are not nuisances. Service and "clean" industries are non-
pollutant and, therefore, perhaps it is not a sacrifice in the
goals of the community to allow their development. In zoning
out all industry per se, an ordinance may prohibit industries
which are not in conflict with community goals.
Because of the changes in the characteristics of many
industries, the contiguous use of land for residential and
a
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business purposes is increasingly possible. Perhaps antiquat-
ed aspects of zoning could be avoided by using extended nui-
sance to determine the highest and best use of land. One can
conceive a situation in the future that nuisance may be the
better method for land use planning. Sweeping no-growth zon-
ing ordinances may be premised on assumptions which are negated
by advanced technology. In their attempts to keep industry
from their cities, municipalities may discover that their
ordinances and policy rationale are not justified under the
police power.
CHAPTER II
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LAND USE POLICY
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NAT.IONAL LAND USE POLICY: A Detente Between Municipalities
And Regions
Land use planning decisions have regional, statewide
and national ramifications. Home rule and local efforts to
plan for urban growth are often incompatable with regional
needs, and in many cases, they can create or exaggerate social
and economic inequities. A National Land Use Policy (NLUP)
might address these issues.
It is in the national interest to
develop a more efficient and compre-
hensive system of national statewide,
and local land use planning and decision-
making .... the rapid and continued growth
of the Nation's population, expanding
urban development, proliferating trans-
portation systems, large-scale industrial
and economic growth, conflicts in emerging
patterns of land-use, the fragmentation of
governmental entities exercising land-use
planning powers, and the increased size,
scale and impact of private actions, have
created a situation in which land-use
management decisions of national, regional,
and statewide concern are often being made
on the basis of expediency, tradition, short-
term economic considerations, and other
factors which are often unrelated to the
real concerns of a sound national land-use
policy. 1
1 National Land Use Policy S. 632 U.S. Senate, 1971 Title
III Part 1 Sec. 301. (a)
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A NLUP may go far in rationalizing the jurisdictional
confusion over which level of government is responsible for
what types of land use decisions. Regional considerations
are seldom incorporated into local growth decisions. With
the advent of increased local controlled growth there is
great potential, absent of the adoption of a NLUP (and state
land use policies) that the imbalance and the poor distribu-
tion of planning power will perpetuate the regional versus
local problems.
As previously developed, zoning is the basis of most
publically directed efforts to control land uses. Zoning is
an extension of the state's power to protect the health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. The extent to which
zoning ordinances reasonably contribute to the above criteria
is a measure of their judicial sanction. When the exercise
of zoning powers is unreasonable or arbitrary, it can be in-
validated. These powers are primarily delegated to locali-
2
ties and have become a major feature of home rule.
Besides zoning, fiscal allocations through governmental
budgets are another way by which cities control urban growth.
Public construction of schools, roads, municipal infrastruc-
2 For a more thorough discussion of the zoning power refer
to the section on the common law. An analysis of zoning as
it contributes to the general welfare is documented by several
cases clarifying the concept.
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ture, major public buildings and facilities, open space allo-
cations for parks and recreation all exert an influence on
the pattern and sequence of development. Such public develop-
ment powers strengthen and support home rule.
Though zoning powers emanate from the state, they are
not generally thought of as state authorized. However, in
constitutional terms, the delegation of zoning power is for
the general welfare. The extension of that concept in space
has caused tension between local control and identity and the
extent of overriding regional and state general welfare
requirements. The locality is the best level of jurisdiction
for arbitrating such broader concerns. Localities are often
incapable of financing broader based public projects and as
previously mentioned, they are unable to extend their juris-
diction beyond their boundaries.
Localities can only etfectively control that physical
area which lies within their political jurisdiction. Cities
may not directly control unannexed or unincorporated land
without the consent of a higher level of authority (county or
state). Yet, in the exercise of the zoning power and in the
drafting of comprehensive plans, cities are increasingly
called upon to be sensitive to social and environmental
forces beyond their physical boundaries.
States have been reluctant to re-establish their funda-
mental zoning authority. In most states this would require
re-enforcing legislation which would involve state legislators
0
-51-
in battles with their constituencies over a "misunderstood
usurption" of planning authority.
NLUP, as envisioned, circumvents the home rule fight.
Authority delegated to localities by state enabling legis-
lation is re-affirmed as emanating primarily from state police
powers. To be eligible for funds available under NLUP, states
must incorporate several features of state.and regional level
planning abilities into their required state land use policies
and plans. This begins a formal clarification of state ver-
sus local jurisdiction in land use planning.
Congress has seen that it is in the national interest
to propose assistance to "state governments to assume land-
use planning responsibility for activities within their
boundaries through NLUP. To accomplish this end, a grant-
in-aid program is proposed which would establish the procedures
necessary to develop, implement, and administer a statewide
land use plan which meets Federal guidelines and which will
be responsive and effective in dealing with the growing
pressure of conflicting demands on a finite land resource
base."
The policy is aimed at long range land use planning at
the state level. State plans must project land-use require-
ments within the state or region for agriculture, recreation,
urban growth, commerce, transportation, the generation and
transmission of energy, and other important uses for at least
fifty years in advance. Conceivably, when a city attempts to
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limit the residential growth within its boundaries, it will
eventually have to reconcile its perception of future develop-
ment with state expectations and demands. The federal govern-
ment will expect land use planning to be orchestrated at the
state level.
Federal requirements envisioned under NLUP are aimed
primarily at cities under 250,000 in population or that are
less than 20 per cent of the total state population.3
Coincidentally, unincorporated areas, suburbs, and smaller
scale urban concentrations are experiencing the most accelera-
ted rate of residential growth. This also appears to be the
scale where most local no-growth initiatives have occured. A
state land use plan must determine the highest and best use,
based upon projected local, state, and national demands for
a variety of needs among which are recreation, agriculture,
mineral, commercial, industrial, housing, and natural resource
4
uses. The Policy has established guidelines which describe
a very elaborate planning process. Broad-based locational
decisions can be dealt with at the state level, and therefore
local zoning can be reconciled to state and regional demands.
State level land use planning envisioned under NLUP is
in marked contrast to another important federal program,
3 Title III sec. 305 (b) (1) (B)
4 Title III sec. 305
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Bureau of Management and Budget Circular A-95 Project Review
Procedure, which also intervenes in federally assisted land
improvement. A-95 requires that a regional agency function
as a clearing house to review the expenditure of federal
funds for municipal infrastructure. The allocation of funds
for such projects as water lines, sewerage, drainage facili-
ties, and solid-waste treatment facilities, and federally
subsidized housing have obvious impact on the patterns of
urban growth. Such a process should assess the regional and
inter-regional effects of such federal investment. The re-
view functions on a project by project basis. The generation
of plans is not authorized under A-95. The review may over-
ride plans, but A-95 is not designated to create plans or
priorities.
This ad hoc process leaves much to be desired. With no
specific long range program for federal investment, adequate
survey or assessment of regional and competing needs, or no
abilities to initiate a plan, A-95 is a highly emasculated
function. "The State planning agency's authority must in-
clude the power to implement and enforce the provisions of
5its plan." Furthermore, the agency's power must include
the authority to prohibit, under state police powers, the
use of any lands in a manner which is inconsistent with the
5 Title III sec. 305 (c) (4)
a
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provisions of the plan. According to how strong the state
wishes to enforce the provisions of NLUP, this clearly means
an endorsement of state override of much local planning.
While states have historically been reluctant to engage in
a battle over state versus local planning authority, NLUP can
potentially obviate this battle. States may delegate planning
powers, but the state agency must have ultimate responsibility
for approval and coordination of local plans and enforcement
procedures.6
In the light of the planning processes being used in
no-growth contexts, the intervention of a planning agency
responsible to regional and statewide issues is crucial. The
Ramapo context highlights a situation whereby an aggregation
of such exercises of the zoning power could have the effect
of excluding large numbers of people from moving into an area.
Through the exercise of the powers clarified in the National
Land Use Policy, -the state planning agency would be able to
scrutinize the effects of local no-growth actions and to de-
termine if they are in conformity with regional and statewide
demands. For example, in Ramapo, New York, situation, a capi-
tal improvement plan was held as a valid way of staging de-
7
velopment and as a valid extension of the zoning power.
6 Title III sec. 305 (e) (1)
Golden v. Planning Board of the Village of Ramapo, 30
N.Y. A. 2d 329
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In a case where the state determines that such a suburban
area should accommodate more urban growth and absorb more
of the residential pressures of the primary urban center,
they may see it in the public welfare to help the locality
extend its infrastructure at a faster rate, according to a
broader based demand for such facilities.
Another context, Boulder, Colorado, is challenging
in that the demands for both growth and no-growth demands
have credibility. The local desire tc maintain the environ-
mental amenities of the Boulder Valley and the Flatirons of
the Rocky Mountains dictates a conservative attitude towards
growth. Developing performance criteria for residential con-
struction, industrial and commercial location from Boulder's
point of view means a basic discouragement of growth. It does
not take much imagination to deduce from observation that
rapid urban development is taking place between Boulder and
Denver. Thus, Boulder's attempts to stop growth are futile
unless a Boulder-Denver regional growth strategy is created.
Boulder in limiting its growth simply transfers that potential
to adjacent areas. This transferal of potential is a matter
of state and regional concern. Furthermore, the implications
of Boulder's potential diminished low income opportunity struc-
ture is of state concern and should fall under the purview of
the state land planning agency.
A National Land Use Policy has immense potential for
opening up the process of controlled growth. Cities have
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historically viewed themselves as private domains princi-.
pally responsible and responsive to local residents. Con-
trary to this notion are realities which dictate a different
approach to planning. Localities exist as parts of regions,
and the general welfare as defined by state zoning enabling
legislation, and NLUP means that localities are not private.
The general welfare means consideration, citizens both in-
side and outside, present and future residents.
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NLUP is consistent with many other programs of the
Nixon Administration which promote the "new federalism."
The fundamental planning authority of the States is re-con-
firmed through a number of provisions previously mentioned.
Presumably NLUP parallels other attempts to put decision-
making as close to the electorate as possible.
Until 1973, decisions on the allocation of funds for
federally assisted housing development under the various sec-
tions of the Housing and Urban Development Act were primarily
made by the federal government. Not only through the exercise
of its funding powers for housing, but for water resources,
solid waste, utilities, open space, park lands, and new commu-
nities, the federal level was increasingly called upon to make
land use decisions. Often these decisions had a major impact.
Federal health, housing, and anti-poverty programs directed
what was then considered, national priorities. Funds which
were never obtainable through the private sector and through
smaller governmental units for low and moderate income housing,
elderly housing and new communities were obtainable from the
federal level. The insurgent political forces of racial
minority groups in this country, the elderly and other groups
began to direct national priorities in the area of housing
beyond the traditional Federal Housing Administration Mortgage
Guarantee Programs. Innovative programs in health, education,
and job training were based primarily on the moral and ethi-
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cal awareness produced in the civil rights movement. Yet,
the money necessary to fund these areas was politically
grounded in the new federal machinery, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, and the Department of Labor. These
programs had not been institutionalized as has been Social
Security or any of the Trusts. Obtaining funds from HUD or
HEW was greatly based on politics. There was little "auto-
maticity involved in the funding process. Nearly all of
the funds of the housing and poverty programs were dependent
on political ideology and national sentiment.
Federalism argues that government is more capable of
response and responsibility at levels lower than the national.
State and local officials are closer to the electorate and
therefore, the priorities of the citizens can be more directly
realized. In the area of urban development and land use plan-
ning, it is further argued that States and localities should
direct growth rather than allowing many of the major decisions
to be made by federal fiscal and budgetary allocation. NLUP
asserts that beyond a few federal guidelines, the bulk of the
8 Automaticity is a feature of federal funding whereby pro-
posals are awarded funds on specific criteria which are ex-
plicit. Proposals complying with the guidelines are automatic-
ally awarded funds. For example, obtaining funds from Social
Security is an automatic process, there are mandatory require-
ments for both qualification and the issuance of funds.
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policy, planning and budgetary formulations will be state and
local functions. Therefore, in the area of housing, it will
be up to each state to develop its own housing development
policy. In reconciling the potential problems of no-growth,
the state will have the ability to intervene, if it so chooses,
to stimulate the development of housing where there may be
severe shortages of particular categories. The planning pro-
cess and the state response to adverse effects will be much
closer to the constituency in proximity and jurisdiction.
It is not incumbent upon states to develop strong cen-
tralized planning agencies. There are no guarantees that the
states will take strong advantage of NLUP potential. They may
establish a variety of lesser institutional structures which
will allow compliance with NLUP. Regional planning authori-
ties are also an answer to the problem and they may also serve
as surrogate planning structures. But they are not required
by NLUP. However, in each of the cases, a central state agency
must assume the responsibility for land use policy and imple-
mentation. In Colorado, where local control over land use
charaCterizes the political culture of the state, there may
be reluctance to enact a more powerful centralized planning
agency. However, the New York Urban Development Corporation
assumes broad state powers for planning and development and
is able to waive local laws, ordinances, zoning codes,
charters and constitutional regulations when such powers are
required to undertake state development.
W -I
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The character and features of State Land Use Policies
as defined by NLUP are extremely flexible. It behoves these
political economic and social forces concerned with low in-
come mobility to put pressure on the states to create more
accountable state and regional planning bodies. Structures
for appealing the decision making from the locality to the
region to the state will be extremely important in adjudica-
ting the effects on the poor of no-growth.
Many no-growth problems are not dealt with in the pro-
posed NLUP legislation. The specific criteia for local urban
growth, regional criteria for allocating housing, public
facilities and open space are not and cannot be explicit under
NLUP. Such problems must be clarified under State Land Use
Policies sensitive to the idiosyncracies of the individual
states and regions. There is a profound recognition implicit
in NLUP that the federal government has no business directing
land use at the national level. NLUP cannot be seen as a
panacea for the ~ills of land development. It does, however,
put the states in a position of responsibility for planning
NLUP offers no guidelines for the creation of a land use
appellate structure at the state level. Such a mechanism
could offer legislative reconsideration of local actions as
a prior condition to court litigation. Few states have
zoning appeals boards which can arbitrate individual or
aggregate local actions. Therefore, the courts have become
increasingly involved with making land use decisions when in
effect, one would assume a planning board to be more quali-
fied to make such decisions.
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decisions which have jurisdictionally overlapping and criti-
cal effects. This reflects both the realities of suburbani-
zation and the increasing interdependence of regions. It
also reflects the priorities of the Nixon Administration.
States may abdicate their low income responsibilities
in land use as they may in fiscal allocations under revenue
sharing. States may transfer the money and power to the muni-
cipalities if the forces of homrule are more articulate and
powerful than those requiring publical.ly directed.economic
redistributive effects. We can, however, look forward to a
more accessible style of government. Land use priorities may
be lucid, and the electorate can point to a governmental
structure liable for its actions.
In conjunction with revenue sharing, state land planning
agencies can seriously begin to address some issues of more
equitable resource distribution. Depending on how far the
particular state advances its planning powers, limited public
purpose develoPmfient becomes a possibility. With the ability
to undertake a planning process and to establish plans and
priorities coupled to state level revenue sharing funds, the
states may be able to initiate much broader public interest
development.
The private market is not always capable of initiating
all of the development required in the public interest.
Under no-growth constraints, more public interest development
is necessary because of increased and inflated land and con-
, "M - T .1 ' "" 'W" P
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struction costs. The Massachusetts Housing and Finance
Agency is an example of a state private partnership in the
area of housing development. A more broadly functioning
agency is the New York Urban Development Corporation. Such
public development corporations may have the powers to the
instrumental in intervening when aggregations of local actions
have the net effect of creating regional housing imbalances
and diminishing other low income opportunities.
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CHAPTER III
BOULDER, COLORADO AND CONTROLLED GROWTH
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A CASE STUDY OF CONTROLLED GROWTH AND LOW INCOME OPPORTUNITY
Boulder, Colorado is facing the problem of uncoordinated
land use planning. The Boulder Area Growth Study Commission
was created as a result of citizen response to their perceived
loss of environmental quality which poor development and over-
population causes. Established as an effort to grasp the sig-
nificance of growth in the Boulder Valley, the Commission must
both study growth patterns, and formulate alternatives to the
existing patterns. Goals for continued and controlled aspects
of urban growth must be articulated. Trade-offs between poli-
tical, economic, social and environmental interests in con-
trolling growth must be made explicit. Policies for the arti-
culation and implementation of the goals must be adopted.
Legal constraints on the implementation of controlled growth
must be understood and abided by. Competing regional demands
and requirements for growth must be balanced with local de-
sires and needs to limit growth. The costs of limiting growth
must be understood as well as determining who must bear those
costs.
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A case study of Boulder will establish parameters for
a discussion of controlled growth and low income mobility at
the suburban municipal level. The above series of statements
are offered to focus the basic issues which should underly a
thorough understanding of how controlled growth can affect
the opportunity structure of the poor, the elderly, and other
groups which depend more heavily upon public policies, assist-
ance and intervention for the basic amenities of life.
Establishing a no-growth policy which is both socially'
and environmentally sensitive is a task which demands a tre-
mendous amount of consideration by the growth study. It would
be relatively simple for the Commission to suggest a one-
dimensional no-growth policy for Boulder which would contain
all of the rhetoric of preserving low densities, protecting
the ecology of the area, and preventing major new industry
from entering the city. It is quite another thing to suggest
a series of related policies which respect the differential
needs for growth; leaves sufficient margins for the inclusion
of a more diverse socio-economic population mix; and respects
the overriding regional pressures for growth in various income
and employment sectors.
To present a controlled growth planning strategy which
is multi-dimensional; environmentally responsible, economically
feasible, and most important, socially equitable is a formi-
table task for the Boulder Area Growth Study Commission.
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EMERGENCE OF NO-GROWTH IN BOULDER: The Boulder Research
Model
The evolution of the no-growth planning concept in Boul-
der is an example of citizen interest groups attempting to
direct city policy. Two local environmentally oriented citizen
groups Zero Population Growth (ZPG) and People United to Re-
claim the Environment (PURE) proposed an amendment to the City
Charter. One of two no-growth issues on the ballot in November,
1971, the ZPG/PURE amendment advocated limiting of the ultimate
population of Boulder to 100,000 persons. This resolution
was defeated 58 1 percent to 41 1 percent. A city-sponsored
resolution asking for a "definitive analysis of the optimum
population and growth rate for the Boulder Valley" was approved
by a 70 percent majority.
These two citizen reactions represented a perception of
the future development of the Boulder Valley; present trends
will lead to irreconcileable environmental problems, over-
crowding, and a loss of the suburban amenities. While it
*
"The city government, working with the county government
shall take all steps necessary to hold the rate of growth in
the Boulder Valley to a level substantially below that ex-
perienced in the 1960's and shall insure that the growth that
does take place shall provide living qualities in keeping with
the policies found in the Boulder. Valley Comprehensive Plan."
a
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has been stated that the Boulder Valley would be able to sup-
port well over 140,000 people given the water supply, develop-
able land, and existing transportation systems, (a doubling of
the population) local sentiment demanded an addressing of
growth with an eye towards curtailing the rate. The ZPG and
PURE amendment was aimed at limiting growth in all housing,
economic, and industrial sectors. Allegations that the ini-
tiative per se was aimed at just one socio-economic group,
as was true in the Valtierra Case in California, were false.
To carry out the mandate of the resolution, the Boulder
Area Growth Study Commission (BAGS) was created. Appointments
to BAGS were made by City Councillors and County Commissioners.
Funded under a $100,000 HUD 701 comprehensive planning grant,
the Commission was to undertake a one year analysis of the
1
area in and around Boulder. BAGS developed a research
model which contains many features of the community and pro-
fessional involvment, and an analysis of four alternative
futures for Boulder. The results of this process will be
presented to the Boulder City Council and the County Commi-
ssioners in the fall of 1973. Whether or not the'city and
county will accept the ultimate proposals suggesied by BAGS
is undetermined.
1
No-growth as a Planning Alternative: A Preliminary Exami-
nation of an Emer< ing Issue, Earl Finkler, American Society
of Planning Officials, Chicago, 1972, page 33.
* Statement by Guage Davis, Beardsley Davis Associates.
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The BAGS research model involves three primary process-
es:
1. Community Consultation Process
a. Articulation of Goals
b. Initial Reaction
c. Final Reaction
2. Modelling of Alternative Futures
a. Continue Current Policies Towards Growth and
Land Use
b. Implement a No-Growth Planning Strategy
c. Emphasize Environmental Amenities
d. Emphasize Social, Economic, and Cultural Diver-
sity
3. Analysis of Alternatives
a. Base Information
1. economic/demographic parameters
2. land use planning parameters
3. physical/biological parameters
b. Special Analysis
1. sociological
2. legal/political
3. optimum relationships
4. incentives and disincentives
5. other
FIGURE I
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The community consultation process is vital in that it
provides the vehicle by which public sentiment is obtained
and tested. The first part of the process seeks to clarify
what the initial preconceptions of the public are relative
to no-growth. What does the public want out of a controlled
growth plan? During the course of the study, the public is
supposed to be kept informed about the developments of the
commission. After the four alternatives have been fully
analyzed, the results are to be presented to the community
for reactions. This process has received a great amount of
criticism for its actual lack of response to the public.
Though the rhetoric of community involvement is explicit in
the study outline, in practice, the citizens have had little
actual input. There has been little media coverage, and little
attempt on the part of the Commission to disseminate information.
The second major step of the research model is the arti-
culation of four alternative future scenarios for the Boulder
Valley:
1. Status Quo (Continuation of Present Policies)
What might be expected to happen if we were to go
on as at present, extending utilities with the
developer paying most of the cost, changing zoning
to more intense use when justified, and welcoming
no new major employers.
2 Finkler, op.cit., page 61
0
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2. Decreased Growth Rate (No-Growth Planning Strategy)
What would be the result if intensive development
were halted, new business were discouraged, exist-
ing major employers were asked to stabilize, and
restrictions were placed on intensity of use. This
is essentially the no-growth concept as presented
by the ZPG/PURE charter amendment. This policy
is supposed to represent a contradistinction of the
first.
3. Emphasis on Environmental Amenities and Ecological
Protection
Through the use of land use and development control
policies, this alternative seeks to maximize environ-
mental amenities. Through the use of green-belts,
bike-ways, anti-pollution controls, prohibiting
industries which have any negative impact on the
environment, by banking large tracts of land, and
prohibiting development in the mountains, this al-
ternative provides a scenario of what a 'radical
no-growth' strategy based solely upon ecological
concerns would be -- essentially zero growth.
4. Emphasis on Economic, Social and Cultural Diversity
To avoid the possibilities of becoming an affluent
mono-culture, this alternative proposes to maximize
the socio-economic distribution of Boulder residents.
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Boulder is only about 2 per cent non-white as com-
pared with Denver at 11 per cent. Diversifying
the population making it more in conformity with the
rest of the region is the explicit goal of this
alternative. This alternative was presented in
contradistinction to the third.
The third major part of the research model is the tech-
nical analysis of the four alternative futures. There are
*both primary and secondary analyses. Information concerning
economic/demographic, land use, physical and biological con-
straints will help to clarify many of the "basic" parameters
which must be respected by any of the four alternative futures.
After the base information has been gathered and rationalized,
special sociological, legal, political,. and allied analyses
will be undertaken. Implementation strategies for the alter-
natives will also be suggested.
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BAGS commissioned three principal studies which could
conceivably model aspects of low income opportunity and mobil-
ity under no-growth constraints. Dr. Charles W. Howe and
colleagues, Department of Economics, University of Colorado,
was assigned the development of economic-demographic models.
Beardsley, Davis Associates, Inc., Denver, was assigned the
development of planning and land use alternatives. Dr. Norman
Hilmar and Colleagues, Department of Sociology, University of
Colorado developed the sociological analysis of alternative
growth strategies.
Howe's team undertook the economic-demographic modelling
in order to weigh the impact on the economy and the popula-
tion of various alternative growth and no-growth assumptions.
Basically a sophistication of the San Diego model, the Howe's
Boulder model attempts to simulate the population, value of
housing, households, structure of income, occupation, school-
ing and other critical variables for the construction of com-
3
munity alternative futures. An adquate critique of the over-
all modelling process is impossible at this point, however,
preliminary comments may provide an indication of the type of
problems the study will encounter.
3 Boulder Area Growth Study Commission, Outline of Work
Programs, unpublished working paper and basis of HUD tundcing,
December 26, 1972, page 16.
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Employment is a primary feature of low-income opportu-
nity. It will be necessary to analyze impacts which changes
in the industrial structure under no-growth would have on the
existing or potential employment pool. In determining basic
characteristics of industry, part of the output -- income of
employees -- should be measured in order to array the distri-
bution of employment sectors. Relative labor intensity would
be shown. The ar.ray would also help to measure which sectors
dominante the employment market. Yet, because data on income
distribution within industrial groups is lacking, there is no
differentiation within the pay structure. Only aggregate, and
therefore, average employee income can be derived. Nowhere
in the industrial survey is there specificity of the distri-
bution of income within the various employment sectors. Cer-
tainly one can assume that the construction industry is more
labor intensive than the technical and research oriented
industries, yet there is no actual measurement. Since only
aggregate statistics for income within industry groups are
available, the model will be unable to describe changes in
the shares of particular employees within the group. Because
of this, it will be impossible to understand exactly the distri-
bution of income derived in Boulder by industrial/occupational
sectors. A determination of who is housed in Boulder in re-
lation to who works there is impossible because such an ana-
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lysis is based on an array of all employed in Boulder.
Low income opportunity and mobility is not a feature
of the model per se. How much of the phenomenon the model
captures can only be understood after a more rigorous analy-
sis. The above qualification of its validity only seeks to
exemplify that an actual paradigm of the internal low-income
employment market will not be a by-product of the model.
Beardsley, Davis Associates is responsible for develop-
ing hypotheses about the interrelationships of various plan-
ning and land use factors for testing by the Howe team. These
hypotheses will consider alternative land use patterns under
all existing commitments and constraints: take the results
of the economic-demographic projections together with the re-
sults of the physical-biological constraints mapping, and con-
4
vert them into preliminary alternative land use patterns.
They are also responsible for the calculations of the costs
To understand how well Boulder fits.the common low develop-
ment requirement that people working in a town have a right to
housing there, employment derived in Boulder must be com-
pared to housing opportunities in Boulder.
4 Boulder Area Growth Study Commission, Outline of Work
Programs, unpublished, page 19. Their study does not, per se,
include consideration of common law regional housing require-
ments, developments in a NLUP, or concepts of regional general
welfare requirements as per A,-95 type leverage compelling
communities to open up low income housing in situations where
federal grant assistance is requested. The land use study is
conservative in the sense that it considers primarily what the
market will produce rather than what public welfare may require.
-1 . - I - , "M lv"-WRW%
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quantities, costs and locations of the public and private
investments required for each hypothetical alternative future
land use pattern to the year 1990.
The opportunity structure limited to employment, real
income, industrial opportunity and housing (rental, ownership
and publically assisted) should theoretically fall under these
two studies. A third major aspect of the total modelling of
the opportunity structure should be some forecast of changes
in the role of public assistance caused by the implementation
of the four alternative strategies. Are there going to be
changes in public welfare facilities, health programs, educa-
tional resources, services for the handicapped, elderly, and
unemployable? These three groups strongly rely upon public
policy, public welfare, and transfer payments for their sur-
vival. To what degree are these groups presently adequately
provided for in terms of housing and social services? To what
degree are their programs unfinished or unstarted? Will de-
velopment of further facilities be pre-empted by no-growth?
Will public sector investment be seriously diminished under
growth constraints; what will be the priorities of public
investment?
Hilmar and Colleagues in their sociological analysis
of alternatives should broach the above questions of public
intervention. Their specific responsibilities include a
report on the methods, assumptions and the critical sociological
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factors pertinent to the future community.5 The feasibility
of carrying out the alternative futures on sociological
grounds are extraordinarily underplayed in the overall re-
search in that it represents primarily software investment
and hence depends on public expenditure rather than market
conditions.
These three studies should measure the effect to which
the opportunity structure is influenced by:
- urban growth and industrial expansion (current
trends)
- growth moratoria on residential construction and
limitations on the development of certain types
of industry
- changes in the outlook on public sector investment
in social services and facilities
Who are the minority groups addressed by the models? Racial
minorities often reflect many of the poor in an area, however,
the model should look more closely at sub-groups. More speci-
fically, an adequate model must structure the poor, the elder-
ly, the structured-in-poor, i.e., the handicapped, unemploy-
able, or those out of the labor pool.
5 Boulder Are Growth Study Commission, Outline of Work
Programs, page 29.
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Through the use of incentives, public actions both
establish and shape certain private market opportunities.
"Public priorities" are very much established by those groups
who are in control. In the name of the general welfare, the
character of access to housing, health, education and other
publically recognized necessities is shaped. The FHA Mort-
gage Guarantee Program is a programi of public assistance to
provide access to housing for people of middle incomes.
The wealthy do not need such public financial assistance, and
FHA housing is not priced within the grasp of the poor. When
Blacks, the poor, elderly, and other groups who felt the
private market was not responding to their needs, they pressed
for public assistance in housing development. The shape of
the public (federal) intervention was the Housing and Urban
Development Act which provided subsidies to developers of low
and moderate income housing.
All of this serves to illustrate the fact that the gener-
al welfare as articulated in public policy is dependent upon
a politi'cal context reflecting economic, social, moral and ethi-
cal influences. Enhancing the general welfare is the duty of
governments. Diminishing opportunities for disenfranchised
groups is an arrogation of public powers.
The expression of the general welfare is, therefore, an
aggregation of private ends. Boulder is facing the challenge
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of balancing many sets of needs when it imposes controlled
growth. The law states that all planning powers must relate
to the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare. Under
controlled growth, whose growth will be limited? What aggre-
gation of private ends will be furthered? If the poor have
been previously excluded, they have no internal power base
from which to work.
Thus, the common law is one of the only vehicles for
articulating and arbitrating provisions of low income oppor-
tunity.
Another legal requirement is that the ordinance con-
trolling growth be neither unreasonably nor arbitrarily re-
strictive. This simply means that Boulder must have derived
its scheme (zoning ordinance) and comprehensive plan through
a legitimate planning process. If Boulder chooses not to
have a comprehensive plan, it cannot' have zoning. There is
evidence, however, that Boulder will continue to employ zon-
ing as the basis for rationalizing its urban development.
Yet, due process and equal protection are subject to a dimension
of time. What is valid at the present may become invalid in
the future as the factual situation evolves. Zoning ordinances
too, are not one-dimensional. They are not solely dependept
on whether or not a plan is properly formulated and endorsed.
*
Conceiveably,-Boulder would employ an extension of the
nuisance doctrine to determine compatable uses. Planning
would function in this sense in an ad hoc manner.
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The results of the plan must be weighed in time. Actual
spatial arrangement, and actual opportunity may bear little
resemblance to the original intentions. If low income hous-
ing was an intent, and no public subsid were available to
produce the housing, the results of the plan could constitute
de facto discrimination.
Through its participation in the Denver Regional Coun-
cil of Governments, Boulder County has informally accepted its
share of low and moderate income housing. According to a
housing allocation plan 21,424 such units are to be built in
the region between 1973 and 1977, of which 3606 are to be in
Boulder. This represents approximately 12 percent of the
6.total allocation.
Denver, Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, and Jefferson Counties.
6. Town and County Review, April 4, 1973, Page 3.
The plan, which calls for the construction of 21,454 low
and moderate income units is to be complete by 1977.- In Boul-
der, it calls for the construction of 734 low income and
1,087 moderate income homes in the unincorporated areas of
the county and 359 low income and 1,014 moderate income homes
in the City of Boulder. . For the purposes of the study, "low
income" was defined as an annual income of $4,000 or less and
"moderate income" as $4,000-$9,000 annually. The council's
plan estimates that 88,725 new housing units of all types will
be needed in the five county area by April 1976, Boulder's
share would be 14,495. In formulating the housing allocation
model, the council took seven criteria into account, 1) de-
ficient housing unit conditions, 2) low income housing needs,
3) moderate income housing needs, 4) assessed valuation and
population, 5) employment growth by jurisdiction, 6) house-
hold income - economic dispersion and impact, and 7) housing
growth opportunities.
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This program has not been costed. Low and moderate
income housing development requires substantial subsidy from
the public sector. If adequate public incentives are not
provided for development, the allocation may be no more than
paper work. What level of government will provide the sub-
sidy? Will Boulder itself be responsible for procuring the
funds? The financing of 3606 units may prove beyond Boulder's
abilities on an already heavily constrained budget. Though
there may be every intention to provide necessary margins for
such housing, fiscal limitations may foreclose the opportuni-
ties. Housing allocations are made with respect to the common
law requirements for regional considerations and assessments
of needs. However, if the entire region is not responsible
for assuring the financing, municipalities may be unable to
fulfill the allocation goals. There appears to be a lack of
coordination between housing allocation and the financing
responsibilities. In addition, perhaps there needs to be a
state contribution to the financing in that the Boulder-Denver
SMSA accounts for 55.6 percent of the entire state population.
The Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) hous-
ing allocation plan is informal and subject to the approval
of the individual counties. In addition, the counties must
allocate their share of the allotment throughout the incor-
porated and unincorporated areas. Therefore, this requires
another round of negotiations at the sub-regional level before
any firm policies can be instituted. Municipal policies may
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even preclude what the county has alloted to the particular
locality.
At the same time as DRCOG is allocating growth respon-
sibilities, BAGS is trying to devise ways of limiting growth.
This obviously reflects a conflict in the perception of the
future for the two organizations. Moreover, it shows how un-
decided the entire question is. Essentially, BAGS is trying
to stop or "limit" growth, but also achieve diversity within
the population. DRCOG is trying to specify the development
of various categories of housing growth. Presumably the pri-
vate market continues to develop according to building per-
mits already issued.
DRCOG has, however, recognized the regional character
of housing allocation. Boulder County has been allocated a
proportion of low and moderate income housing which would
make those sectors account for approximately 12 percent of
*
the total family housing stock. This would account for 9-14
percent of the estimated total household population in 1977.
Ostensibly, DRCOG is attempting to diversify the population
in Boulder County, liowever, it has no powers to actually
implement the plan.
With approximately 10-12 percent of the total population
in the Valley at incomes between low and moderate categories,
*
Based on remaining undeveloped approved units and projected
4.2 percent growth rate assumed by the Boulder Valley Compre-
hensive Plan, (existing low and moderate income housing in-
cluded).
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it will be mandatory to encourage employment opportunities
at their level of skills. The conflict arises because BAGS
wants to discourage new major employers in Boulder. Under
this policy, only small new industry and intensive growth
by existing industries would be available to balance the occu-
pational categories. Most likely, given the current mix of
occupations, the employment categories, and the current trends
of increased technical and professional opportunities, few
employment opportunities for the poor will be by-products of
BAGS perception of controlled growth.
There are only a few alternatives available to answer
this dilemma, 1) intensive job training to match the low in-
come population with the skill levels of the Boulder employers;
2) provide incentives for employers matching the skill levels
of the low income population to locate in Boulder; 3) allow
the present employment and housing opportunity structure to
continue; 4) rescind the low and moderate income housing
allocation program and goal of socio-economic diversity.
The consequences of these actions are interesting, but
speculative. The first two alternatives could provide a who-
listic approach to controlled or specified growth. Balanced
housing allocations would accompany specified directed employ-
ment opportunities. People moving to Boulder would know that
employment mobility is as much a possibility as the new hous-
ing. Socio-economic mix would be more highly achievable
than under either free market growth, or radical no-growth.
a
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The last two alternatives contain strong elements of
reality, though perhaps tainted by pessimism. One should
assume the operation of the private market not to enhance
specifically low and moderate income opportunity absent of
strong public intervention and incentives. Without increased
affirmative guidelines for publically subsidized housing, and
concomitant jobs, the opportunity structure will be retarded,
negated, or undeveloped by default.
At the outset of this discussion, it was stated that
private interests greatly determine the priorities of the
public. It is no accident that the relative attractiveness
of Boulder for the types of industry currently located there
is partially caused by public investment. Zoning ordinances
and capital facilities developed by the city itself have made
Boulder a desireable place to locate. In addition, Boulder's
industry is characterized as capital intensive, technical,
white collar, research-oriented, "clean," and is middle in-
come generating. Likewise, if the city thought it in the
public interest to provide incentives for a "share" of labor
intensive, blue collar industry to locate in Boulder, it pro-
bably could be done. It is greatly a matter of public policy.
The entire future of low income opportunity in housing and
employment in Boulder is dependent upon public action to assure
these types of developments.
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Several organizations, agencies, and levels of govern-
ment are undertaking planning in the Boulder-Denver region.
Besides BAGS and DRCOG, the State of Colorado is attempting
to rationalize and clarify the characteristics of its urban
growth plan under a state land use policy. Boulder County,
under its Planning Office, is undertaking land use planning
in the form of amendments to the county zoning regulations,
subdivision permits, and regulations for the development of
unincorporated areas. The Boulder City Planning Department
is engaged in capital improvements which strongly affect
land use development patterns. The private developers have
priorities of investment in housing and plans for development.
Industries within Boulder and Boulder County all may see their
economic future in terms of both intensive and extensive growth.
Many of these decisions have few effects beyond local
boundaries. What the City of Boulder does in terms of bike
paths may bear no importance to the total housing allocation
for the Boulder-Denver region. Likewise, the creation of a
municipal park in Boulder will have little appreciable effect
on adjacent towns. Yet, many decisions have impacts at scales
beyond the particular jurisdiction responsible for the act.
The allocation of 21,000 units of low and moderate income
housing between 1973 and 1977 is of regional if not state con-
cern. The location of a major new industry in the Boulder
Valley will affect all of the cities within the county. The
4 7. M." " -I V, 0 " -_1 _W ml-
-86-
proposed construction of a rapid transportation system between
Denver and Longmont will have effects on housing and employ-
ment in the entire region.
Much of what BAGS will suggest in its no-growth plan
will have few if any effects beyond the City.of Boulder. In
a sense, much of the impetus behind BAGS is a desire to trans-
pose Boulder's perception of the future into a planning stra-
tegy. Establishing recreational regions within the city, im-
posing height limitations on building construction, planting
trees, providing bikeways, preventing development on flood-
plains and severe inclines are all measures which the city
can employ to limit development and maintain character with-
out appreciable effects on neighbors. However, prohibiting
the location of major employers, severely limiting the number
of housing permits to be issued in time and for certain areas
are measures which will have effects beyond the municipality.
It is extremely important, therefore, that the agencies
and authorities undertaking planning and environmental pro-
graming pool their resources. BAGS cannot work in isolation
and expect the result to be immediately acceptable to other
groups also interested in the future of the city, valley, and
region.
The benefits of regional government with respect to plan-
ning decisions extending beyond local boundaries is key to
rationalizing the problem. Both BAGS and DRCOG are able to
suggest plans and priorities, however, they are not empowered
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to undertake planning. The realities of figuring out poli-
tical and economic feasibility make planning, in this respect,
very different from planning implementation. A regional
authority which could orchestrate local initiatives and could
balance multi-municipal influences of local actions would be
a tremendous asset to the Boulder growth study.
BAGS has shown a great amount of sensitivity to the en-
hancement of low income opportunity in Boulder. Throughout
the process of determining alternative futures, the commission
constantly refered to the inclusion of at least 10-15 percent
low and moderate income housing. This allocation would, in
theory, help to diversify a population which is presently re-
latively homogenous, while obviating any potential allegations
of exclusionary zoning. BAGS and the character of no-growth
as perceived by the advocates of controlled growth see new
industrial development as contrary to their goals. Thus, the
need for employment generating facilities for the future low
income residents could be deleted from the planning strategy.
Whether or not a regional planning authority could
persuade Boulder to adopt guidelines for limited industrial
growth is a matter of speculation. The fallacy is, that if
such guidelines are not adopted, Boulder will not be able to
achieve the socio-economic diversity so often spoken of.
Whether or not this dilemma stems from a flaw in the planning
process, faulty or insufficient detail in research, or from
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basic differences in perception, the consequences must be
heavily weighed. It can, however, become a matter of public
policy that incentives and margins are established to com-
plete the opportunity structure for low income people in
Boulder.
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DIVERSITY IN BOULDER
Gaining a more socio-economically and culturally
diverse population was sentiment expressed in the results of
a questionnaire distributed by BAGS, and has become a goal of
the entire study. Though there is fear that Boulder has the
potential of becoming economically and culturally lopsided,
the actual distribution of income, housing costs, and employ-
ment opportunity and changes over time-should be evidenced.
A more diverse population has been equated with increased
low cost housing opportunities. Developments in the common
law indicate that cities will increasingly be required to be
more in conformity with the regional distribution of low and
moderate income housing. While a more diverse population is
dependent upon increased employment opportunities, there is
no legal precedent which reinforces this assumption. Regional
housing requirements may become a matter of law. Employment
opportunities as controlled by public actions remain alterable
only through locally directed public policy.
In relation to the Denver SMSA, in 1970, Boulder's
housing and employment characteristics tended to be heavily
weighted towards middle to high income housing, and an empha-
sis on technical and professional occupations. Most people in
the City of Boulder worked in the County (83.1 per cent),
T-I R- W M M
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while in the rest of the SMSA, about 59 per cent of the work
force worked in the county of their residence. 5.2 per cent
of the population in Boulder had income less .than poverty
level of whom only 2.6 per cent received public assistance,
while in the SMSA, the figures were 6.9 per cent and 4.9 per
cent accordingly.
The industrial base of Boulder is strongly oriented
towards education, research, and manufacturing, with allied
services and facilities. (See Figure IV ) The University
of Colorado, the National Center for Atmospheric Research,
and the National Bureau of Standards are located immediately
in Boulder. IBM is located in Longmont, immediately adjacent
to Boulder, and is one of the major employers of Boulder's
population. Industry in the SMSA is more generally spread
among manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, the pro-
fessional and administrative fields.
It is no surprise that occupationally, the Boulder
population is extremely professionally, technically, and educa-
tionally based. (See Figure III ) While in the SMSA, people
are employed more as clerks, professionals, technicians, and
laborers.
In 1969 the median family income of Boulder ($11,437),
was only slightly higher than that of the SMSA ($10,777).
As was mentioned about those less than poverty level, Boulder
had relatively fewer people who could be classified as "poor".
However, 9.3 per cent of Boulder's population earned less than
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$4,000 per year. In the SMSA, during the same period, 10.1
per cent of the population earned less than $4,000 per year.
(See Figure II )
With relatively more income, and fewer "poor" people
in Boulder, it is not surprising to find housing and rents
more expensive there in relation to the rest of the SMSA.
In 1970, the median value of owner occupied housing in Boulder
was $23,000 while the figure for the SMSA was $19,000. Boulder
had little owner-occupied housing under $15,000 (7.3 per cent)
while the SMSA had 26.4 per cent. Low and moderate income
owner-occupied housing is markedly absent in Boulder. Of the
housing vacant for sale, the median price asked in Boulder
was $25,800, in the SMSA it was $23,200. Most of the vacant
housing in Boulder ranged from $20,000 to $49,999 representing
72.8 per cent. In the SMSA this was 56.8 per cent of the avail-
able housing. It is quite obvious that housing is becoming
more expensive in Boulder than in the SMSA generally. Vacant
low and moderate income housing opportunities in Boulder under
%14,000 account for only 5.8 per cent, in the SMSA they account
for 22.8 per cent.
Though income in Boulder tended to be relatively similar
to that of the SMSA, housing opportunities for the buyer are
much more expensive. (See Figures II through VIII) The
relative attractiveness of the housing stock in Boulder for
the moderate income buyer is mitigated against because of
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higher prices and fewer opportunities at lower price ranges.
The characteristics of rents parallel those of housing.
The median price asked for renter-occupied housing in Boulder
in 1970 was $129; while in the SMSA it was $105. Those rent-
al units vacant for rent required rents of $146 in Boulder
and $118 in the SMSA. Boulder being a "university" town has
a high percentage of students renting apartments and houses.
Because of the flexibility of life style and the relative need
for less space, students often occupy housing which under
other circumstances would have been occupied by families .with
lower incomes. However, with students, the landlord can parti-
tion units differently allowing more renters per structure,
and gaining proportionately more rent.
This pre-emption of low and moderate income rental
opportunities by students should be a matter of public con-
cern. Both students and the families they displace have rights
to housing within the city. Yet, the private market works in
such a way as to foreclose housing to low and moderate income
families. Higher returns are required by the investments of
landlords, and without the subsidies required by developers,
they are discouraged from building such housing.
Changes in distribution of housing, income and employ-
ment categories in the Denver SMSA"between 1960 and 1970 are
interesting. It is important to note that in relation to the
SMSA, Boulder begins to have a greater proportion of white
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collar, professional, technical, manufacturing and service
industries; while construction, mechanical trades, and trans-
portation related industries experience marked declines.
This ten year period has seen a tremendous acceleration
in the location of major research centers, a near doubling of
the University population from 11,006 to 21,482 students, and
a virtual non-growth of citizens employed as laborers, crafts-
ment, and operatives. Not that these are low income employ-
ment categories, but they reflect the employment attractive-
ness of an area for blue collar and unskilled jobs.
With the acceleration in the employment attractiveness
for educational, professional and research occupations, signi-
ficantly higher rents and increasingly more expensive housing
for sale, Boulder has lost much of its socio-economic diversi-
ty. All of the changes in the economic distribution of citi-
zens in Boulder which indicate affluent mono-culture are great-
er than changes generally .throughout the SMSA. The aggregate
picture is a growing imbalance between Boulder, its neighbors
and the region. Low income opportunities in housing and em-
ployment suffered a severe decline between 1960 and 1970.
With fewer blue collar jobs in Boulder, where will the
low and moderate income residents envisioned in the DRCOG
housing allocation by employed? Long distance cummuting costs
in time, energy and transportation expenses may be so exhorbi-
tant to keep many potential residents from moving to Boulder,
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perpetuating cycles of poor housing in other impacted areas.
Addressing jobs is as important as addressing housing.
Neither DRCOG in their allocation or BAGS in their suggestions
of allowing for the growth of low and moderate income housing
have approached the need for these new residents to gain in-
come near their place of residence as does 83.1 per cent of the
Boulder population.
There are inherent fallacies in liberal schemes which
purport to open up housing in the suburbs unless those advo-
cates of fair-share recognize the needs for employment. In
Boulder, opening housing in and of itself will mean little
without greater access to income. Building thousands of units
of low cost housing without proportional jobs could mean the
people for whom the housing was developed would not fully
occupy the units. The fair-share housing eventually could be
occupied by the other group which competes for low cost hous-
ing, the students.
In analyzing the industrial base in Boulder, and recog-
nizing the city's professed desires and abilities to curtail
the location of new industry, one should become suspicious of
the "liberal" sentiment surrounding "fair-share" housing.
What this suggests is that DRCOG and more specifically BAGS
propose an employment generating strategy to create a con-
text of economic mobility for the low and moderate income
residents. This will require a serious modification in the
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attitude towards industrial location. It will mean establish-
ing a more specific guideline for businesses desiring to locate
in Boulder. They must specify what employment categories they
will benefit. In addition to using environmental impact or
other criteria to assess desireability, this will add a dimen-
sion of social welfare accounting. This may provide the city
with more valid criteria for limiting industrial growth while
eliminating some of the regressive by-products of no-growth.
One should bear in mind the consequenc.es of not address-
ing jobs as an integral part of the total housing allocation.
If new residents do not have access to jobs, either they will
not re-locate in Boulder; they will re-locate in Boulder and
commute elsewhere for jobs; or they will re-locate in Boulder
and become unemployed. Neither of these scenarios is the most
efficient strategy for utilizing human resources. The first
alternative implies a basic failure to distribute low cost
housing in a way which attracts poorer people. The second is
basically regressive, requiring the poorer residents to bear
greater costs to be employed. While the third means greater
welfare payments, public assistance, and a perpetuation of
cycles'of poverty. Certainly if one is planning for poverty
as opposed to planning for economic mobility, a housing allo-
cation plan in the suburbs without consideration of the employ-
ment attractiveness of the area will accomplish that end.
Bear in mind that Boulder's employment categories are skewed
away from jobs which would approach the skill levels of the
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poor.
What is suggested in light of the factual situation
in Boulder is that a basic concept of new communities be
adopted. Low income mobility is not simply dependent upon
constructing shelters. Employment, supportive public facili-
ties and infrastructure, schools, open space, and other in-
tegral urban functions must be recognized as interdependent.
Housing opportunities must be accompanied by concomitant jobs,
public services and facilities.
A housing allocation plan should adequately reflect
the regional discrepancies in housing distribution. The
allocation should be neither overly ambitious nor conser-
vative. Boulder is not tremendously out of line with the
distribution of low and moderate income families in the
Denver SMSA. To over stimulate low income housing may produce
the detrimental results of poverty re-enforcement which
Forrester describes. Not to produce adequate levels of
such housing will continue inpacts on other areas in the region.
a
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FIGURE I I
INCOME OF FAMILIES
DENVER SMSA
BOULDER
DENVER
1959
Less than $1,000
$ 1,000 to $ 1,999
$ 2,000 to $ 2,999
$ 3,000 to $ 3,999
$ 4,000 to $ 4,999
$ 5,000 to $ 5,999
$ 6,000 to $ 6,999
$ 7,000 to $ 7,999
$ 8,000 to $ 8,999
$ 9,000 to $ 9,999
$10,000 to $14,999
$15,000 to $24,999
$25,000 and over
Median income
Source: U.S. Census
3.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
13.0
12.0
10.0
9.0
6.0
13.0
4.0
2.0
$6,894
SMSA
1969
2.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
7.0
31.0
19.0
5.0
$10,777
BOULDER
1959 1969
2.0 1.0
4.0 2.0
7.0 3.0
8.0 3.0
8.0 4.0
11.0 5.0
13.0 4.0
11.0 6.0
8.0 6.0
7.0 6.0
16.0 30.0
4.0 24.0
1.0 6.0
$7,105 $11,437
VIP
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FIGURE III
OCCU PAT ION
DENVER SMSA
BOULDER
DENVER SMSA BOULDER
1960 1970 1960 1970
Employed persons
16 years old and over
Professional, technical,etc. 15.1 19.8 25.2 32.8
Managers and administrators 10.5 9.7 11.7 8.5
Sales workers 8.2 8.3 7.7 7.2
Clerical, etc. 18.6 21.2 16.1 19.3
Craftsmen, foremen, etc. 13.2 12.2 10.4 8.0
Operatives 12.5 11.5 6.7 7.3
Laborers (non-farm) 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.2
Farmers and farm managers .7 .4 .3 .2
Service workers (non-household) 9.2 11.8 11.8 13.2
Private household workers 2.1 1.0 3.3 1.1
Source: U.S. Census
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FIGURE IV
EMPLOYMENT
DENVER SMSA
BOULDER
SMSA BOULDER
1960 1970 1960 1970
Employed Persons 16 years old
and over
Agriculture, forestry and 2.0 1.2 1.1 .7
fisheries
Mining .9 1.7 .6 .4
Construction 7.0 6.2 6.0 3.6
Manufacturing 19.1 17.0 10.6 16.4
Railroads and allied services 1.5 .9 - .1
Trucking service and warehousing 2.0 1.8 .6 .6
Other transportation 1.7 .2.0 .7 .8
Communications 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.6
Utilities and sanitary services 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.0
Wholesale trade 4.9 5.8 1.4 1.4
Food, bakery and dairy stores 2.6 2.3 2.6 1.9
Eating and drinking places 3.1 3.6 3.0 5.5
(General merchandise retailing) (3.2) (2.5)
(Motor vehicles retailing/ (2.4) (2.3)
gas stations)
Other retail trade 10.5 5.5 11.7 5.7
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FIGURE IV (cont'd)
SMSA BOULDER
1960 1970 1960 1970
Employed Persons 16 years old
and over
(Banking and credit agencies) (2.0) (1.4)
Insurance, real estate, and 5.9 4.6 4.9 3.1
finance
Business services 1.5 2.4 2.0 3.0
Repair services 1.5 1.6 .9 1.3
Private households 2.3 1.0 3.9 1.1
Other personal services 3.6 3.4 5.4 3.3
Entertainment and recreational .9 1.0 1.0 1.2
services
Hospitals 3.3 4.4 2.8 2.8
(Health services, expect (2.4) (1.9)
hospitals)
Education (government and 4.6 8.6 19.9 24.1
Private
(Other education) ( .6) ( .8)
Welfare, religious and non- 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.8
profit
Legal, engineering and misc. 3.6 3.2 4.5 5.3
Prof. serv.
Public administration 7.3 6.6 7.8 5.8
(Industry not reported) (3.9) (2.1)
Source: U.S. Census
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FIGURE V
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING
DENVER SMSA
BOULDER
DENVER SMSA
1960 1970
Value of Owner-Occupied Housing
Less than $5,000
$ 5,000 to $ 7,499
$ 7,500 to $ 9,999
$10,000 to $12,499
$12,500 to $14,999
$15,000 to $17,499
$17,500 to $19,999
$20,000 to $24,999
$25,000 or more
Median
Source: U.S. Census
2.3
6.0
11.8
19.9
19.4
15.2
9.2
7.7
8.4
$13,800
0.6 1.1
1.8 4.3
3.9 7.1
8.5 12.0
11.7 16.9
14.3 21.6
14.5 12.9
19.7 11.3
24.9 12.8
$19,100 $16,000
1960
BOULDER
1970
%
0.3
0.3
1.0
2.5
4.2
9.1
14.2
27.3
41.0
$23,400
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FIGURE VI
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING
DENVER SMSA
BOULDER
DENVER SMSA
1960 1970
Value
Specified vacant for
Less than $ 5,000
$ 5,000 to $ 9,999
$10,000 to $14,999
$15,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $24,999
$25,000 or more
Median price asked
Source: U.S. Census
BOULDER
1960 1970
sale
2.5
11.7
29.2
30.3
9.7
16.6
$16,100
1.4
6.6
14.8
18.1-
14.1
44.9
$23,200
- 1.4
- 4.3
- 13.0
- 29.0
- 52.2
$25,800
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FIGURE VII
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING
DENVER SMSA
BOULDER
DENVER SMSA
1960 1970
BOULDER
1960 1970
CONTRACT RENT
Renter occupied
Less than $30
$ 30 to $ 39
$ 40 to $ 59
$ 60 to $ 79
$ 80 to $ 99
$100 to $119 (over $100)
$120 or more
No cash rent
Median rent
Source: U.S. Census
2.9
5.8
19.4
22.2
19.1
13.3
12.9
4.3
$78
1.6
1.8
9.7
15.8
15.4
14.4
37.7
3.5
$105
1.6
3.8
17.7
22.7
22.3
(26.9)
5.0
$82
0.8
0.8
4.9
9.3
10.4
15.6
55.7
2.4
$129
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FIGURE VIII
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING
DENVER SMSA
BOULDER
DENVER SMSA
1960 1970
CONTRACT RENT
*
Specified vacant for rent
Less than $40 15.9 3.7
$ 40 to $ 59 27.4 11.3
$ 60 to $ 79 22.0 14.8
$ 80 to $ 99 16.4 11.6
$100 or more 18.3 58.6
Median rent asked $66 $118
Excludes one family homes on 10 acres or more
Source: U.S. Census
BOULDER
1960 1970
7.4
18.4
15.9
20.3
38.0
$86
1.9
4.0
12.9
4.3
76.1
$146
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CHAPTER IV
COMMENTS ON CONTROLLED GROWTH STRATEGIES
AND LOW INCOME OPPORTUNITY
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WHAT OR WHO IS THE GENERAL WELFARE? Comments on Low Income
Opportunity in Boulder
Boulder could foreclose opportunities in housing and
employment for minorities through controlled growth. Depend-
ing on the character of the plan ultimately decided upon in
the final community consultation, the city may radically alter
patterns of access to housing and jobs for various income
groups and occupational categories. Through directed public
intervention, that alteration could be an enhancement, re-
tardation, or negation-of opportunity.
As previously developed, municipalities have histori-
cally employed a variety of techniques to limit and constrain
aspects of their land use. Zoning and patterns of public
spending are the principal ways of controlling growth patterns,
spatial arrangements, public development and improvement pri-
orities. The ability for the public to intervene in land
conversion and arrangement stems from traditional statutory
laws, grants of police powers, common law, and more recently
through state land use policies.
The concept of the general welfare as a zoning purpose
is growing in scope. Public funds cannot be spent absent of
stringent guidelines and public policies. All legislative
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acts are ultimately subject to the scrutiny of the courts.
The "public hand" in urban growth should be complementary
to private interests, encouraging the private market to pro-
vide housing, environmental and employment amenities for all
income and racial sectors. The "public hand" must also voice
concern, adding incentives and often intervening directly
when the free market is unable to provide the basic necessi-
ties of life for all groups.
An analysis of Boulder leaves many questions. What
happens when this municipality consciously decides to control
its growth? What should be its perception of limited growth?
In the planning process, has Boulder recognized its obliga-
tion to plan for regional housing needs? Has the resulting
planning strategy provided sufficient margins so that the poor
and other minority groups have access to the city? Are there
margins within plan for the eventual accommodation of all
people employed within the city who wish to live there?
Prior to any overwhelming international, national, or
state concern for the limits of growth, municipalities have
helped to control growth and to shape their character by
actively constraining and encouraging certain aspects of urban
development. Various types of protective covenants and con-
servation conditions can limit who can use a certain parcel
of land for specified reasons. As extensions of the "collect-
ive will" as delegated to planning authorities, cities were
and are able to gain character and have their idiosyncracies
sheltered.
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Public priorities and initiatives are generally directed
by financial, social and political forces. Those who are
powerful can use the public arena to enhance their particular
goals. It would follow that those powers able to control and
limit growth do so from a position of strength. The strength
may be in money, numbers, political or social ideology. Such
groups obviously see their futures being enhanced by no-growth.
Yet, what about those groups who are unable to articu-
late their "urban" Aeeds through traditional channels of power.
What about groups who are not presently in Boulder. What about
groups who view their economic survival in terms of added
opportunities generated through growth in employment facili-
ties and housing. Those who are impoverished because of a
lack of opportunity and discrimination rather than because
of lack of personal initiative, welcome growth and public
policies demanding affirmative action in employment.
According to Penfield Tate, a Black city councilman,
one of the problems of stopping growth in Boulder, especially
industrial development, is that many of the service-sector
workers in the city are unemployed. In commenting on the low-
er level maintenance and service jobs connected with the uni-
versity, he said "that more industry is needed to free these
p 7'
people from the university domination on the job market."
7. Finkler, op.cit., page 36.
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However, this tdo, may be a naive assumption. If the
private market does not provide housing or employment within
the grasp of poor, or if the type of industry generated does
not match the level of skills of the people in the area, more
opportunitiy for the poor will not necessarily accompany
more growth. If growth is characterized by capital intensive
highly technical, cybernetic-based industry, and if the un-
employed, underemployed or unskilled have no access to con-
comitant training, growth will offer no income redistributive
effects.
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THE PRIVATE MARKET AND LOW INCOME OPPORTUNITY UNDER NO-GROWTH:
CONCLUSIONS
Housing and public service facilities which affect the
poor can be heavily controlled by public intervention. -The
zoning power can regulate the height, density, type and loca-
tion of housing, while the amount of housing is regulated by
building permits and subdivision controls. Priorities of the
municipal budget control the pattern and quality of public
investment and social services.
Site location (extensive growth) and capital investment
(intensive growth) by industries are greatly determined at
scales beyond the municipality. Land costs, proximities to
transportation, "regional attractiveness," utility connections
and tax assessments are chief factors governing future indus-
trial investment. To a degree, some of the factors can be
regulated by a municipality through nuisance and zoning. But
many determinants are either beyond local control or easily
circumvented. In any case, research and clean industry appear
to be the type of installations most attracted by the Boulder
Valley. They are certainly non-nuisance industries. One won-
ders of more of this minimal environmentally impacting industry
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might ultimately be seen as an asset rather than a liability.
It must also be determined what public services such as
additional schools, recreational and transportation facilities,
and social services for the elderly and handicapped are en-
visioned by BAGS even under controlled growth. The research
must anticipate how dependent these facilities are upon the
income and tax generating abilities of the private industrial
market. If the industries locate beyond Boulder's jurisdic-
tion, then how will Boulder capture their potential tax reve-
nues? All of these questions are highly interesting because
little is known about the effects which no-growth have on tax
and income.
Absent of strong public intervention, the income and
social service redistributive effects which BAGS expects, will
be extremely difficult to produce. If filtering must help
the poor, the growth mode is the only context in which filt-
ering of housing or employment or their expansion can have
any appreciable effects on the mobility structure of the poor.
Boulder should re-assess its industrial zoning criteria.
There is a need to differentiate between types of industry;
not all industries are heavy polluters and case heavy impacts
on the city. The grounds on which zoning ordinances prevent-
ing new major industries were passed may bear no resemblance
to the type of industry attracted to Boulder. If "clean"
industries attempted to enter Boulder and they were ruled out
because the zoning purpose was to prevent polluters from
coming in, then perhaps the rationale behind the zoning is
irrelevant. Boulder may do well to consider a more nuisance/
environmental impact orientation towards land use. Instead
of warding off all industry, perhaps the nuisance doctrine or
certain performance criteria would help Boulder differentiate
between. acceptable and unacceptable industry.
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We also know that the private market will nct in and of itself
create housing for the poor; high land costs and building
expenses mitigate against low cost housing. Additionally,
industry in the Boulder Valley tends not to create labor in-
tensive employment opportunities. If the poor are going to
depend upon private entrepreneurs and developers to create
opportunities enhancing their mobility, it can be anticipated
under strict no-growth, that less mobility will result. Ab-
sent of countervailing governmental intervention, the inter-
play between housing development and industrial location will
probably only- allow new employers to be of a small scale, and
only expensive high return housing to be built
Thus, there are strong arguments for BAGS to propose
limited and spcified growth in housing and industry. Public
initiative in the direction of encouragement labor intensive
employers and through affirmative action programs, coupled
with a continuation and expansion of publically subsidized
housing programs for the poor, elderly, and handicapped may
help to obviate some of the regressive by-products of no-
growth..
Earlier, the responsibilities of state land use planning
as proposed in the National Land Use Policy were discussed.
The concept of NLUP supports state scrutiny of local actions
having effects beyond local jurisdiction. A-95 Clearinghouse
Review is another "watch-dog" which scrutinizes effects of
local development actions, albeit for federal investment in
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local infrastructure. Additionally, the common law cita-
tions as developed by the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Massa-
chusetts courts interpreted the general welfare as defined in
state enabling legislation requires regional housing demands
to be reconciled in local actions.
Boulder's growth limitations, or the aggregation of
similar actions on a regional scale, may have the net effect
of creating an entire region of diminished low income opportu-
nity. Colorado has recently shown a strong inclination towards
both controlling and balancing urban growth. Many of the
Colorado Land Use Commission, Senate Bills 91,92 and 93
as adopted by the General Assembly of Colorado, 1971. The
Colorado State Policies Act or Senate Bill 377 introduced
April, 1973, which spells out a series of state land use goals,
defines areas and activities of critical state concern, and
establishes a five-member state commission with broad regulato-
ry powers. As applicable to this thesis, the policies address
the elimination of development which results in urban sprawl,
and which fills in the land between existing communities;
stimulation- of population growth in. rural areas outside the
front range where local and regional plans call for such '
growth and development. The entire Front Range is designated
as an area of statewide concern. All of Boulder and the Den-
ver region is included in this area. Under the bill, the state
regulatory commission would have the authority to review most
of the subdivision and zoning changes proposed by local and
regional government. If the commission found the proposed
change did not imbibe the goals and policies of the Act, the
commission could reject the request requiring the local govern-
mental body to make appropriate corrections. Additionally,
the bill provides for the creation of between 10 and 15 re-
gional planning commissions throughout the state. The re-
gional commissions may design and implement policies witIr the
approval of the state commission.
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above developments will be recognized. As evidenced in efforts
to implement a state land use regulatory structure, regional
accounting and state-level approval of local and regional
policies may go far in making growth controls generally more
economically and spatially equitable.
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Boulder is exemplary of many cities attempts to
reconcile their image of the future with economic, environ-
mental, political and social realities. As a case study of
a city's planning process in time, many of the unanswered
questions confronting Boulder will perhaps leave the reader
unsatisfied. What the final planning strategy derived from
the community consultation process, and the policies which
address low income mobility will be, can only be a matter of
conjecture. What is interesting and significant is that
Boulder has designed a planning process which does seek out
many of the more difficult questions. By raising these
apparent conflicts and dilemmas to a level of community con-
sciousness, the -Boulder Area Growth Study Commission is attempt-
ing to circumvent political battle lines from being drawn.
Two types of problems surround environmental issues:
physical problems .arising from development, and resultant
social and economic by-products. This thesis has not attempt-
ed to elaborate upon physical and ecological justifications
for controlled growth. While they are a major thrust for
growth controls in Boulder, they have been de-emphasized.
The social dimensions of urban and industrial growth
policies are so great that this thesis has clarified the legal
and statutory parameters which help to ensure the rights of the
poor under controlled growth. The experience of Boulder shows
that suburbs have great abilities to diminish the opportunity
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structure of low income people by controlling various aspects
of growth. If Boulder were to implement a no-growth policy
entirely based upon ecological arguments, it would be a mis-
use of those bases, and it would not address needs of the poor.
There are certainly many growth -- no-growth dilemmas
confronting this country. Growth in-and-of itself will not
necessarily produce income re-distributive effects. Uncon-
trolled growth will necessarily mean high rates of environ-
mental pollution. Given our current free mrket system which.
distributes most goods, income and services, no-growth will*
mean the continued indefensible disparity in access to decent
housing and employment between the poor and the affluent.
The ecological crusade, if taken literally,
will either stifle growth or will drive.
up housing cost; in either event the
heaviest burden will fall on the poor.
By the same token, the production of all
the housing that is needed, at the right
price and near job opportunities, may
be expected to have adverse effects on
the environment that has become so'
precious to the white middle class.
Ecological and environmental issues have been thought
of as white middle class concerns, while housing, public health
welfare services, and "public" facilities have been labeled
minority problems. By escaping from the urban centers to
1 Richard Babcock and David Callies; Ecology and Housing:
Virtues in Conflict, Resources for the Future, April 14, 1972,
Page 2.
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the suburbs, the middle class hoped to leave many overriding
"urban" problems behind. They found, however, that many of
the social and physical problems they faced in the cities
were evident in their new domain. Suburbs contain their
share of urban problems such as traffic congestion, crime,
racial conflict, poor schools, housing inadequacies and pollu-
tion.
Because answers to these problems are largely unknown,
and where known, often difficult to implement, many groups
have presented the alternative of stopping, if not seriously
reducing the rate of urban development. Given more time,
perhaps more alternative solutions will arise. Environmental
and ecological concerns are the current rhetoric used to justi-
fy many land use and urban development regulatory policies.
They have become surrogates for other more socially and econo-
mically based problems. Therefore, many unrelated problems
become equated to the environment for political reasons.
...Controversies over federally sub-
sidized housing are only the most visible
evidence of a pervasive - anti-growth mood.
Those who have benefited from past growth
seem less secure about retaining these
benefits. Their mood does not reverse
previous attitudes that welcomed racial
and economic diversity in urbanizing areas:
it simply strengthens a pre-existing
hostility towards such diversity, providing
it with more dramatic fiscal and environ-
mental justifications. 2
2 Potomac, o Page 5.
a
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Environmental arguments are not of themselves anti-
social, although a great many groups have mis-used them.
High rates of economic growth have been accompanied by in-
creasing unemployment, rising disparities in income both
between groups and regions, and the deterioration of social
and cultural conditions.
In the past, there has been a tendency to equate con-
tinued development with economic growth, and to measure both
in terms of the rise in the gross national product. It is
currently recognized that high rates of economic growth do
not necessarily ensure that pressing social and human prob-
3lems can or will be resolved. A dilemma posed by assuming
that continued growth rates are the keys to solving poverty,
is that, while a rising GNP and necessarily high accompany-
ing level of energy consumption do mean greater amounts of
pollution and material resources consumption, there are no
guarantees that income redistributive effects which also accom-
pany that activity will necessarily result. Unless the govern-
ment recognizes this, there are few justifications for con-
tinued rates of economic and urban growth. Where growth can
be demonstrated as having specific redistributive effects
there is greater legitimacy in encouraging that growth.
Development and Environment, A report submitted by a Panel
of Experts convened by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Founex, Switzer-
land, June 4-12, 1971, Page 2.
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It has been argued in many public and private sectors
that there is a void of policy which addresses the social and
economic by-products of controlled growth. While such policy
tends to be more implicit in the political machinery than it
ought to be, there is certainly not a void of domestic policy
which relates specifically to these issues. Legal assumptions,
which must be implicit in a growth control policy must address
the due process, equal protection, and right to travel doc-
trines of the constitution. Furthermore, growth control mea-
sures are influenced by statutory laws which elaborate on the use
of public powers and the general welfare purposes under which
they may be exercised.
If local, state and national goals for continued urban
growth are articulated and made more explicit, perhaps we will
be better equipped to meet the future. No-growth advocates
are right in biding for more time to assess our growth pro-
blems. But because many citizens are poorly housed and with-
out adequate means to gain a decent income, they demand better
ways of redistributing material and social resources. So long
as we live in an economy primarily based upon private capital
and the free market to create and distribute goods and ser-
vices, continued growth in certain sectors of the economy
to generate those needed facilities must occur.
Governments must recognize that the free market cannot
distribute goods, employment and services to all income sec-
tors in a manner concomitant with the greatest public utility.
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Government itself must take affirmative steps to ensure
better redistributive effects from growth. Under these con-
ditions, there is further legitimacy in requiring industrial
and urban growth rates to decline.
APPENDIX A
a
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